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ABSTRACT 
A growing number of major sports mega-events, usually held in Western liberal states, are 
finding new hosts in the emerging world. This has risen controversial opinions but the 
question of why this trend is happening remains. The following thesis draws attention to the 
socio-political factors behind the phenomenon. 
The theoretical part discusses relations between sports mega-events and the forces of 
globalization. Theory of hybridization is considered most suitable in the context of the 
work. Possible explanations to the research question are assessed on the basis of existing 
literature. 
Bidding processes for the hosting rights of eight consecutive Olympic Games are examined 
in the empirical part. It is concluded that the existence of geopolitical aspirations is the 
most important factor causing international sport to move towards emerging countries. 
 
Keywords: mega-events, sport, international relations, globalization, geopolitics, Olympic 
Games.  
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INTRODUCTION 
There are only few occasions when international relations and global processes can be 
directly observed. International sports mega-events are one of those occasions. They can be 
regarded as multinational celebrations of modern societies where nationalist notions are 
mixed with the forces of globalization while the whole world is watching. It is somewhat 
paradoxical that these hugely popular and widely followed open spectacles often conceal 
motives other than “sport for development and peace” as propagated by different 
international organizations. The world stage provided by such events is a tempting concept 
for many interested parties, states in particular. On the other hand, the competitive yet 
playful nature of sport creates an emotional atmosphere which might provide unique insight 
to the state of international relations. It is therefore surprising that mega-events and sport in 
general has not been brought up to more academic attention.  
In social science sports mega-events have most widely been associated with the processes 
of globalization. These issues will be assessed in the theoretical part of this thesis where I 
argue for a wider understanding of globalization in relation to mega-events. This is 
important because the simple explanation of globalization as homogenization fails to 
provide sufficient basis for the main research question: why is international sport moving 
towards emerging countries?  
In some ways this phenomenon combines many previously researched mega-events related 
topics. Most of them focus on economic or social issues surrounding the hosting of such 
events like the Olympic Games or football World Cup. Developed countries have become 
more reluctant towards hosting major sporting events and are concerned with financial risks 
and urban development problems. At the same time, strong political and emotional motives 
behind the bids of emerging countries have been somewhat neglected in mega-events 
research. I believe that current trends observable in the pursuit for hosting mega events 
reflect on the state of international relations. Mega-events hosted by emerging countries 
therefore hold symbolic value for the host nation and for international relations as well. 
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This thesis critically assesses possible explanations to the ongoing power shift in the 
hosting of mega-events. First, theory of globalization and its different forms are discussed 
to provide a solid theoretical framework for the thesis. Then, four main hypotheses to 
explain the drift of sports mega-events towards emerging countries will be presented and 
further explained qualitatively. In the third chapter, empirical analysis is conducted with 
data from eight consecutive Olympic Games to support the theory. Variables are then 
statistically tested. Results and conclusions will be provided in the end. 
I argue that geopolitical incentives are relatively more important than economic factors (as 
normally believed) for winning the rights to host sports mega-events. I also suggest that 
less democracy and higher corruption helps emerging countries to be more successful in 
their pursuit for the hosting rights.  
9 
 
1. THEORETICAL BACKROUND 
1.1 Theory of Globalization and Sport 
International sports mega-events are cultural, economic and political phenomena which, for 
a short period of time, captivate the attention of people and groups of all different interests 
around the world. It is therefore only natural that these events are considered to be the main 
contributors to the unifying processes of globalization. However, when we consider that the 
Olympic Games, FIFA Football World Cup and other global sporting festivals also 
reinforce national sentiment, raise political confrontation and spur international rivalry, the 
coherence between sport and globalization does not seem as self-evident as first thought.  
In this section of the thesis I argue that international sports mega-events and globalization 
are closely interrelated but that the role commonly placed on the Olympic Games – or any 
other mega event – on that matter is overestimated and often misinterpreted. I find that the 
narrow concept of globalization as homogenization does not suit the contemporary 
developments of sports mega-events and adopt the theory of globalization as hybridization 
which better explains different aspects of the topic at hand.  
First, I discuss sports mega events in their most commonly perceived role – as the 
locomotive for development and globalization. Then, I move on to discussing mega-events 
in the context of identity and nationalism – forces which contradict the globalizing powers 
of mega-events. Finally, I discuss globalization as hybridization as the main theoretical 
groundwork for this thesis. 
1.1.1 Globalization through mega-events 
Presidents of sports organization and politicians like to stress the unifying nature of sport 
and the all-positive effects of hosting global festivals such as the Olympic Games. This 
understanding thrives on a theoretical standpoint, propagated by „hard-line advocates of the 
globalization thesis“ who believe that we live in a post-nationalist world and that distinctive 
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identities based on the idea of nation are being eroded.
1
 This trend is supposed to bring 
forth „ever-increasing homogenization and the emergence of global culture“.2 While mega-
event organizers often present these possible developments as means for world peace, 
others see it as a source for conflict and resistance. For example, both the United Nations 
(UN) and the International Olympic Committee (IOC) see sport as a tool for building and 
promoting a peaceful society.
3
 Helen Lenskyj, on the other hand, often links the negative 
effects of the Olympic Games with those of globalization and categorizes Olympic resisters 
in the same group with “other antiglobalization activists”.4 Both sides, however, 
acknowledge the homogenization capabilities of sports mega-events and such is also the 
prevailing consensus amongst many scholars, politicians and activists who have made the 
connection between sport and globalization almost a common knowledge.  
The starting point for this approach is quite obvious and is rooted in economics. The 
International Olympic Committee claims that “The Olympic Games are one of the most 
effective international marketing platforms in the world, reaching billions of people in over 
200 countries and territories throughout the world.”5 If one was looking for mechanisms for 
reaching global audiences, you could not wish for a better one. The Marxist (or neo-
Marxist) way to look at globalization at this point would be to assess the global 
developments as part of the capitalist economic process. This approach suggests that 
globalization has an agency and an intended purpose.
6
 Most theorists however, “argue that 
although some elements of the phenomenon are intended, most are accidental and are 
certainly beyond the control of individuals, states, or even economic systems”7 Certain 
patterns of market-oriented processes can also be observed in the Olympic movement 
(which will also be further discussed in detail later on in this work). Whether these are part 
                                                 
1
 Bairner, Alan. “Sport, Nationalism, and Globalization. European and North American Perspectives”, State 
University of New York Press, Albany, 2001. Here pp 5-6. 
2
  Bairner, 2001. Here p 6. 
3
 The Olympic Charter, International Olympic Committee, December 2014, p 11. „Sport for Development and 
Peace: Towards Achieving the Milennium Development Goals“, Report from the United Nations  
Inter-Agency Task Force on Sport for Development and Peace, United Nations, 2003, p1. 
4
  Lenskyj, Helen Jefferson. “Olympic Industry Resistance: Challenging Olympic Power and Propaganda”, 
State University of New York Press, Albany, 2008. Here p 28. 
5
 IOC official website, http://www.olympic.org/sponsors, viewed 01.12.2015. 
6
 Bairner, 2001. Here p 8. 
7
 Bairner, 2001. Here p 8. 
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of imperialist intentions and the spread of westernization – or not – is open for debate. 
Nevertheless, one can not avoid the fact that major corporations infused with western ideals 
are being promoted through these global mega-events. From the case of London 2012 
Olympic Games, with a projected 3,6 billion viewers (which makes for an amazing 76% of 
the potential global audience)
8
 that saw the Games and were exposed to the logos and 
advertisements of the Olympic partner program (TOP) sponsors like Coca-Cola, 
McDonald´s, P&G, Visa, Samsung, Panasonic etc., it seems almost inevitable not to claim 
that sport is the biggest instigator for globalization.  
Another aspect of globalization through sports mega events is revealed in the candidate 
cities´ pursuit towards gaining more recognition and power by becoming a “global city”. 
Holger Preuss describes global cities as “centers where economic power is concentrated”9. 
Preuss brings out some factors which the host cities develop, for example in the process of 
organizing the Olympic Games, that are important for becoming a global city: new bureau 
houses, improvements in telecommunications, gentrification of a part of a city, first class 
tourism and an international airport.
10
 Hosting a sports mega event intensifies the 
globalization process and aides the city in the developments of becoming a global city 
which then potentially increases its economic might and influence. This is a possible goal 
in both international and domestic level since mega-events serve as an opportunity to 
(re)gain some might for cities that have experienced loss of importance or are shadowed by 
other global cities in the country.
11
 This is clearly evident in the cases of non-capital cities 
like Munich and Barcelona that have hosted the Olympic Games and have established 
themselves as high contenders for economic and cultural dominance in their respective 
regions. 
                                                 
8
 London 2012 Olympic Games Global Broadcast Report, IOC 2012. 
http://www.olympic.org/Documents/IOC_Marketing/Broadcasting/London_2012_Global_%20Broadcast_Re
port.pdf, viewed 30.11.2015. 
9
 Preuss, Holger. “The Economics of Staging the Olympics. A Comparison of the Games 1972-2008”,  
Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 2004. Here, p 93. 
10
 Preuss, 2004. 
11
 Preuss, 2004. Here pp 21 and  93. 
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Since contemporary sports mega-events are one of the most heavily securitized events on 
the planet, another contribution to one impact of globalization emerges. Helen Lenskyj 
describes it as “the replacement of “heavy capitalism” in the form of industrial production 
with the more portable “light capitalism””12 which allows struggling urban areas to find 
new revenues from tourism. This is achieved by increasing the overall surveillance and 
security measures which are supposed to portray the city as a safe and appealing tourist 
destination.
13
 Increased levels of surveillance combined with huge media attention and 
large-scale coverage of the events does leave us to believe the imminent emergence of 
global culture. David Rowe says that “such [televised] sporting mega-events are especially 
dramatic presentiments of a fully developed global culture of the future, in which the 
“whole world is watching”…”14. 
However alluring the prospect of a unified world may be, I find this understanding of 
globalization to be somewhat misleading as it combines two different ends of the term´s 
theoretical spectrum. The variation, as described by Rowe, is as follows: 
 “At one end of the theoretical spectrum, globalization is a technical term describing 
the greater economic, political, technological and communicative connectivity that 
has been evolving for centuries. /…/ At the other end of the spectrum, globalization 
is figured as a transformative process at every level, accelerating rapidly since the 
late 20th century, systematically eroding locally specific structures and practices, 
and imminently ushering in a common global culture.”15 
I believe that the increasing global connectivity does not necessarily lead us to a common 
global culture even though such parallels are often easy to come by. It is largely because 
“…globalization has supplanted ‘postmodernity’ in sociology (and, indeed, in cultural 
studies) as an omnibus concept used to explain transformations and to describe their 
                                                 
12
 Lenskyj, 2008. Here p 71. 
13
 Lenskyj, 2008. Here p71. 
14
 Rowe, David. ” Sport and the Repudiation of the Global”, International Review for the Sociology of Sport, 
2003 38: 281, pp 281 – 294. Here p 284. 
15
 Rowe, 2003. Here p 282. 
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outcomes in totalizing fashion.”16 However, when it comes to the nature of sport, post-
modernity and post-nationalism are not easily implemented concepts. 
Although many scholars like Preuss suggest that under the assumption of increasing 
globalization national sovereignty erodes and regional identity becomes more important 
than national
17
, it is hard to imagine a situation where sport is detached from the concept of 
nation. It is therefore inescapable to study the relations between sport, identities and 
nationalism to fully understand the place and potential of sports mega-events in the 
processes of globalization. 
1.1.2 Sport, Identity and Nation 
The prevailing consensus in sports studies acknowledges nationalism and localism as forces 
of resistance to the processes of globalization but mostly suggests that “the relationship 
between sport and national identity is self-evidently unraveling to reveal an increasingly 
homogeneous global sporting culture.”18 However, many case studies in Alan Bairners 
book suggest that the resilience of national sentiment and identity politics of formerly 
submerged ethnic groups are fueled by the very same developments.
19
 This leads us to an 
obvious paradox where globalization supposedly nurtures both national and post-national 
tendencies. Rowe says that “it is improbable that sport can be reconfigured as postnational 
and substantially stripped of its ‘productive’ capacity to promote the forms of identity 
(local, national, geopolitical, racial and so on) because these are, simultaneously, the source 
of its affective power and the potentially activated resistive impediments to the 
globalization process.”20  
All of sport is more or less related to some aspect of the concept of nation. Competitive 
sport is a spectacle where the fans always come to support “their own”, wearing national 
colors and chanting national slogans and songs. We almost never see amongst the crowds, 
for example, someone waving the flag of the European Union – the spectacle is always 
                                                 
16
 Rowe, 2003. Here p 282. 
17
 Preuss, 2004. Here p 295. 
18
 Bairner, 2001. Here p 1. 
19
 Bairner, 2001. 
20
 Rowe, 2003. Here p 287. 
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personalized and spiced with national pride. Even if we take the case of international 
sporting leagues where many players and athletes compete outside their home countries and 
where the composition of the teams is not based on a particular ethnic identity, the clubs 
they represent still “retain a ‘national’ brand irrespective of the composition of their playing 
and coaching staff and of their shareholder register…”.21 Whichever way we look at it, the 
concept of nation is still somewhere to be found. Sport, therefore, may be considered an 
important factor in modern societies where nationalist ideas and identities are nurtured and 
celebrated. 
Another way in which nationalist-infused politics finds its way to sport is through media 
coverage of the events. There is a tendency for local media systems to be “embedded in the 
political economic structure of society” and for journalists to be “heavily reliant on sources 
from established institutions”22. It means that sports mega-events are covered and 
interpreted slightly differently in different locations around the world to fit the political 
culture of the country and the expectations of its newsreaders. In a 14-country comparative 
data analyzes on how different countries’ television news covered the events preceding 
Beijing 2008 Olympic Games, it was found that journalists localize and politicize foreign 
news to give them more meaning in the local context and to add distinctive national 
perspectives.
23
 Furthermore, mass media coverage of sporting events provides a “huge 
contribution to a shared national consciousness” by creating a “sense of belongingness to 
the nation”.24 This is achieved through collective viewing of the sporting spectacles and 
supporting the national representatives. All in all, there is no escape from the nationalist 
sentiment contained in sports mega-events because both sport itself and the media circus 
surrounding it are intertwined with nationalism and politics. 
                                                 
21
 Rowe, 2003. Here p 286. 
22
 Lee, Francis L. F.; Chan, Joseph M.;  Zhou, Baohua. “National lenses on a global news event: determinants 
of the politicization and domestication of the prelude to the Beijing Olympics”, Chinese Journal of 
Communication Vol. 4, No. 3, September 2011, pp 274 – 292. Here  p 276. 
23
 Lee, Chan and Zhou, 2011.  
24
 Cho, Younghan. „Unfolding sporting nationalism in South Korean media representations of the 1968, 1984 
and 2000 Olympics“, Media, Culture & Society, 2009 31: 347, pp 347 – 364. Here p 349. 
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It all comes down to the competitive nature of major sporting events which are “perfectly 
suited for articulations of nation” 25. Rowe says it is because they “function effortlessly as 
metaphor for the state of the nation at the popular political level”26. Bairner on the other 
hand suggests that it is also possible for fans to support their team without being attracted 
to or feeling concerned in any ways about the county´s government and its national 
politics.
27
 In both cases, however, the fact remains that sport is deeply dependent on the 
concept of nation and that the restrictive manifestations of modernity will always be 
inserted to the proposed emergence of post-modernity when considering  the relations of 
sports mega-events and globalization.  
Although we can imagine a situation where different identities are united through the 
universal practices of sport, we can not forget that sport is most powerful in the presence of 
competitive national performance. “National” will therefore always have an advantage in 
appeal as compared to “post-national”. Bairner adds that nationalism “touches people´s 
hearts and minds in ways that cosmopolitanism does not and may never be able to”28 As 
long as we can not detach sport from its strong connection to national identity, we can not 
expect sports mega-events to be fully capable of ushering in the age of global sport, culture 
and society. Therefore, a concept of globalization which does not necessarily predict a 
culturally homogeneous world, needs to be asserted for assessing the complex nature of 
sports mega-events. 
1.1.3 Theory of hybridization 
Jan Nederveen Pieterse says that “…in social science there are as many conceptualizations 
of globalization as there are disciplines.”29 The majority of studies on mega-events focus on 
economic and social issues which arise when applying for and hosting a global event such 
as the Olympic Games. As a result, globalization in relation to sports mega-events is often 
                                                 
25
 Rowe, 2003. Here p 286. 
26
 Rowe, 2003. Here p 285. 
27
 Bairner, 2001. Here p 17. 
28
 Bairner, 2001. Here p 16. 
29
 Pieterse, Jan Nederveen. “Globalization as Hybridization”. In: Fetherstone, Mike; Lash, Scott; Robertson, 
Roland. “Global Modernities”, Sage Publications Ltd, 1995. Here p 45. 
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interpreted in terms of economic and cultural homogenization. In this thesis, however, the 
focus is on global politics and the relation of global forces against national interests. In that 
prospect, globalization is better viewed as a process of hybridization rather than 
homogenization. 
As shown before, international sports mega-events contribute to the homogenization side of 
globalization by reestablishing and reinforcing the images, rituals, celebrations and events 
of standardized and westernized establishments (such as IOC and FIFA) and their corporate 
sponsors. On the other hand, the same content is creatively transformed by host nations to 
display a certain set of specialties and values – may it be skills and success in certain sports, 
architecture of the venues or staging of the ceremonies – which all contribute to the 
heterogenization side of globalization. The contest narrative created by the nature of sports 
combined with local identities create a unique confrontation to homogeneous global 
sporting culture imposed by trans-national institutions governing sports mega-events. As a 
result, we get a mixed display of globally predominant culture next to local cultural 
specialties of the hosting nation through the medium of the mega-event. 
One term to describe this effect is “glocalization” which “refers to the complex interplays 
between local and global processes in regard to globalization.” 30 Globalization in that sense 
is not just a one way process where “the local” is suppressed by “the global”. This is 
certainly the case for sports mega-events (which are widely used by hosting nations for 
purposes of reinvention, promotion and advertisement of “the local”) where local 
innovation and interpretations can influence the global event: be it the addition of new 
sports to the official program, new technological or economic solutions, the staging of the 
ceremonies or the legacies left behind from the events. All of this can diversify the global 
scene and influence the behavior of different involved parties in the future. Therefore, we 
must recognize that the relation between “the global” and “the local” is not necessarily an 
irresolvable conflict but rather a matter of interdependency. 
                                                 
30
 Giulianotti, Richard. “The Beijing 2008 Olympics: Examining the Interrelations of China, Globalization, 
and Soft Power”, European Review, Vol. 23, No. 2, May 2015, pp 286 – 296. Here p 287. 
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Similar effects can be observed in culture. According to Pieterse, “cultural hybridization 
refers to the mixing of Asian, African, American [and] European cultures”, and that 
“hybridization is the making of global culture as a global mélange.”31 This approach leaves 
room for “crossover culture”32 which also acknowledges the influences of non-western 
cultures, on both the western culture and on each other. It also portrays globalization as a 
process which creates fuzziness and diversity rather than uniformity. Hybridization 
therefore downplays the effect that western culture has on the overall processes of 
globalization. 
For a working theory of hybridization, however, Pieterse says that a neat version of 
messiness or an unhybrid categorization of different hybridities is needed.
33
 It means that 
we need some sort of differentiation where hybridity “concerns the mixture of phenomena 
which are held to be different”34. Most obvious categories could be nations or cultures. 
Hybridization as a cross-category process would then blur the distinctions between them. 
But hybridization could also refer to specific sites or fairs “which bring together the exotic 
and the familiar, /…/, performers and observers”.35 Sports mega-events could therefore be 
perfectly implemented for the practices of hybridization. 
However, I believe that in today’s state of global relations and in the context of sports 
mega-events it is yet early, if at all possible, to perceive the makings of global culture as 
global mélange. Even Pieterse recognizes that hybridization “has been concealed by 
religious, national, imperial and civilizational chauvinism.”36 Although mega-events 
provide us with a magnifying glass on processes of globalization, they also insert the 
dominant paradigm of nationalism as a filter which portrays culture as nationalized and 
territorialized. Therefore, we can observe different clashes where hybridization is both 
welcomed and contested by existing institutions of the western mind-set. This leads us to a 
standpoint where some aspects of the mélange are accepted but others not as much. For 
                                                 
31
 Pieterse, 1995. Here p 60. 
32
 Pieterse, 1995. Here p 53. 
33
 Pieterse, 1995. Here p 55. 
34
 Pieterse, 1995. Here p 55. 
35
 Pieterse, 1995. Here p 56. 
36
 Pieterse, 1995. Here p 64. 
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example, cultural diversity during the Olympic Games is welcomed until it falls within the 
framework of western liberal ideology. 
Ultimately, this approach still provides the best theoretical grounds to answering the main 
research question of why international sport is moving to emerging countries. When we 
were to consider globalization as merely the process of western imposed homogenization, 
one could suggest that there would be no resistance to the hosting of the events amongst the 
“winning side” of globalization. But instead we see a struggle where the IOC and FIFA 
(along with support from the UN) try to incorporate supposedly universal western ideals 
while having to face the reality of reluctance towards mega-events in developed democratic 
countries and an increasing interest in emerging non-democratic countries. Contemporary 
sports mega-events and the shift towards emerging countries could be seen as hybridity in 
the making. All the elements are there: first, the emerging countries are forced to play by 
the rules of the dominant West and are being exposed to the forces of globalization; 
secondly, trans-national sports organizations have no alternatives to accepting the strong 
emergence of non-western players and adapting to the new situation (both IOC and FIFA 
have been subject to substantial reforms); and thirdly, national, political and economic 
ambitions are haunting over the supposedly benign intentions of sport and its unifying 
power. 
Richard Giulianotti claims that “sport mega-events may be regarded as particularly 
powerful manifestations of contemporary globalization” 37. International sport is in many 
ways the most popular, most emotional and most powerful form of both nationalism and 
globalization. I believe that sports mega-events are the most important and evident 
examples for the processes of globalization as hybridization. This assumes the recognition 
of complex interplays between “the global” and “the local”, “national” and “trans-
national”, “the West” and “the rest”.  
 
 
                                                 
37
 Giulianotti, 2015. Here p 287. 
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1.2 The Clash of Civilizations, Athletics and Emotions 
As intensifiers of globalization and emotions, sports mega-events can highlight ongoing 
tensions in international relations and reveal the existence of certain clashes. Global 
participation and the competitive nature of the events create a perfect atmosphere for 
observing processes that in other circumstances could be discussed mostly on theoretical 
grounds. Sports mega-events can therefore provide us with unique evidence and examples 
to global theories and power relations. 
1.2.1 The Clash of Civilizations 
One of the most well-known and talked about theories in contemporary social science is 
Samuel P. Huntington´s clash of civilizations. Huntington believes that the main source for 
conflict in modern world politics is culture. He says that in the 21
st
 century “nation states 
will remain the most powerful actors in international affairs, but the principal conflicts of 
global politics will occur between nations and groups of different civilizations”38. Mark 
Dyreson says that Huntington´s claim “requires scholars to focus their attention on the most 
popular and widespread contemporary global phenomenon on the planet – sport.”39 While 
acknowledging Huntington’s division of the world into different civilizations based on 
religion, Dyreson also notes that all these civilizations “have embraced a common cultural 
practice, modern sport, [which] makes international athletic contests significant touchstones 
for examining and analyzing the nature and complexity of these clashes.”40 
So let us examine some of Huntington´s claims in the context of sports mega-events. For 
one, he says that increasing interactions between peoples of different civilization intensify 
awareness of differences which pushes civilizations towards clashing.
41
 When we consider 
the Olympic Games and FIFA World Cup to be one of the biggest global meeting points for 
people of different cultures, according to Huntington, sports mega-events could increase the 
                                                 
38
 Huntington, Samuel P. „The Clash of Civilizations?“, Foreign Affairs, 1993, pp 159 – 169. Here p 159. 
39
 Dyreson, Mark.” World Harmony or an Athletic ‘Clash of Civilizations’? The Beijing Olympic Spectacle, 
BMX Bicycles and the American Contours of Globalisation.” International Journal of the History of Sport, 
Jun2012, Vol. 29 Issue 9, pp 1231 – 1242. Here p 1232. 
40
 Dyreson, 2012. Here p 1238. 
41
 Huntington, 1993. Here p 160 – 161. 
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potential for civilizations to clash. At first, this seems a bit illogical since sport is widely 
recognized as the connector of cultures and smoother of differences. However, if we look at 
the ten-fold increase in security costs of the Olympic Games of the new century
42
 
(compared to pre-9/11)
43
, there might be something to it. Although sports mega-events 
portray non-violent ideals, they also provide an international stage which some malicious 
groups, who do not share the same ideals, may want to exploit in order to draw attention to 
their own cause through the means of violent attacks.  
Huntington also says that the “processes of economic modernization and social change”/…/ 
“weaken the nation state as a source of identity”, and that gap is filled with “the revival of 
religion”.44 Although, I do not fully disagree with Huntington, the same processes can also 
be the source of the revival of nationalism and these processes are especially visible during 
sports mega-events. Dominique Moïsi believes that sport, by the means of media, is 
becoming something of a secular religion.
45
 Therefore, some overlapping themes can be 
noted and the clashes between secular and religious, national and global remain vital. 
An important clashing point in Huntington´s theory, which is also very potent in the context 
of mega-events, is the confrontation between West and the non-West. “A West at the peak 
of its power confronts non-Wests that increasingly have the desire, the will and the 
resources to shape the world in non-Western ways.”46 In this claim lies one possible answer 
to the question why international sport is increasingly important to emerging countries. The 
mega-events can be used as tools for the purposes of claiming ones position on the global 
scene and to reshape the existing structures. This could be described according to 
Huntington as the clash of civilizations at the macro-level where global importance is 
sought for and civilizations “struggle over the control of international institutions and third 
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parties”47. But mega-events can also provide means for civilizations to clash at the micro-
level where civilizations struggle “over the control of territory and each-other”48. This is 
evident when mega-events are used to conceal violent disputes, most notably in 2008 when 
Russia invaded South-Ossetia, a part of Georgia, under the cover of the commencing 
Beijing Olympic Games. 
1.2.2 The Clash of Athletics  
So far I have discussed sports mega-events as both the platform and a tool for the processes 
of globalization and the clash of civilizations. However, not just the mega-events but also 
their main content – sport – is used to achieve similar effects. Mark Dyreson uses the term 
“athletic clash of civilizations”49 which refers to the clashing elements contained within 
international sports. The athletic clash is based on practices where athleticism and different 
sports are used to impose imperial culture and lifestyle, describe measures of national 
vitality and to gain soft power. 
Alan Bairner says that “sport emerges as a cultural form that can be exported and/or 
exchanged from the eighteenth century onward with Britain and its expanding empire 
playing a pivotal role.”50 The export of British imperial sport served as a unifying tool to 
smoothly incorporate colonial countries into British cultural space. This however did not go 
without some drawbacks and was not a start of a homogeneous sporting culture as British 
sporting empire also induced resistance and even created heterogenization in some cases. In 
the US, new versions of British games were invented, and in Ireland a completely different 
set of sports were promoted to preclude all things British.
51
 So, the idea of sport as a tool 
for unification, while also being the source for potential confrontations, dates back 
hundreds of years.  
Similar effects can be observed in the suggested Americanization of world sports today. 
The spread and popularity of American sports such as basketball and volleyball and the 
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inclusion of new action sports to the Olympic program do indicate such tendencies. 
However, truly American sports – baseball and American football have not had similar 
success.  The actual export of American sport has not been most successful due to other 
countries´ already established sporting cultures
52
, however, USA still seeks growing 
influence through media coverage, the establishment of rules and sponsoring. 
Perhaps most interesting is the inclusion of action sports to the Olympic program which 
some claim to be a result of transnational forces and the IOC´s attempt to move along with 
times. Dyreson, however, sees a peculiar version of Americanization beneath this alleged 
globalization.
 53
 He says that “the growing significance of action sports at the Olympics 
represents the ‘Californication’ of Olympic spectacles”54 and that “in American minds, 
sport serves as a cultural ‘Trojan horse’ for American interests.”55 It means that most action 
sports pastimes (like BMX biking, mountain biking, snowboarding, triathlon, and beach 
volleyball) grew in a particular culture –  the American, and mostly in California – promote 
the American lifestyle and serve most the interests of American companies and 
broadcasters. Action sports “facilitate the linkages between consumption, individualism, 
and lifestyle”56 and therefore serve as tools for the preservation of American hegemony. 
In this regard, sports mega-events could be seen as means for the hegemon to strengthen its 
positions but also as a chance for the emerging powers to showcase their abilities and 
surpass the rulers in their own game. For example, Beijing 2008 Olympic Games could 
then be interpreted “as an athletic ‘clash of civilizations’ between the world’s leading 
superpower and [China – ] the nation that seems poised to challenge American 
hegemony.”57 Therefore, in a quick return to the theory of globalization, Pieterse would 
note that “…hegemony is not merely reproduced but refigured in the process of 
hybridization.”58 
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In the clash between world superpowers and civilizations sport is also believed to “provide 
fundamental measurements of the vitality of nations.”59 This usually means counting the 
total number of medals won by countries in major sporting events. The Olympic Games in 
particular represent “the most potent and symbolic arena in which many states attempt to 
increase their national prestige through winning medals and enhancing their position in the 
medal table.”60 Higher ranking suggests greater strength of the country and its people and 
higher productivity of the system making the medal table a soft power indicator. Giulianotti 
marks that “in this regard, the Beijing Games may be seen as a major attempt to tackle the 
substantial soft power deficit that China holds vis-à-vis many other countries”, and that 
China´s negative soft power balance is demonstrated in its “tendency to import rather than 
to export sport and other cultural ‘products’.”61 This might also be the case for all emerging 
countries who are lacking in soft power and see sports mega-events as means to advertise 
and export some of their own (sporting) culture and thus gain soft power in return.  
1.2.3 The Clash of Emotions 
Dominique Moïsi says that in addition to the clash of civilizations, the world is also faced 
with a clash of emotions. He believes that “the Western world [as in the United States and 
Europe] displays a culture of fear, the Arab and Muslim worlds are trapped in a culture of 
humiliation, and much of Asia displays a culture of hope.”62 Not only does this theory 
provide a meaningful perspective on the state of contemporary international relations, it is 
also most applicable in the context of sport and the main research question at hand. 
According to Moïsi, the United States and Europe are labeled under the culture of fear. It is 
the fear of terrorism and the fear towards immigration, the fear of ageing and economic 
downfall. “What unites all these fears is a sense of loss of control over one's territory, 
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security, and identity – in short, one's destiny.”63 Western culture is used to being the 
dominant force in the world but suddenly it is faced with a relative decline in many 
different yet vital areas of life. Globalization seemingly works in favor of keeping the 
Western dominance but simultaneously contributes to the problem. “Every day, the Middle 
East is confronted with the contrast between globalization's winners, essentially the 
Western world and East Asia, and those who have been left behind.”64 This is yet another 
blow to the Muslim world which “has been obsessed with decay for centuries”65. Arab and 
Muslim worlds have therefore fallen in the culture of humiliation but unlike the West, are 
united by it.
66
 
The fears of the West are transferred and revealed in the reluctance to take any risks that 
might contribute to the fears becoming a reality. Hosting mega-events is a risk just like that: 
it draws a lot of (unwanted) attention, spikes immigration and is a financial gamble. This is 
one of the reasons why there will be a 12 year gap in Western-hosted Olympic Games.
67
 
According to Moïsi, “Europe and the United States seek to permanently banish their fears 
but will be able to do so only by finding a way to help the Muslim world solve its 
problems.”68 
 “As the West and the Middle East lock horns, confidence in progress has been moving 
eastward.”69 As bystanders to the confrontation between fear and humiliation most of Asian 
countries have managed to focus on progress and are living in a culture of hope. As in fact, 
the mightiest country in the culture of hope had some help transcending the regime of 
humiliation through the means of international sport. Moïsi also recognizes the potential of 
sport when he says that in 2008, „as the organizer of the Olympic Games, China 
symbolically and emotionally reclaimed its place as a center for history and its international 
legal succession. Majestic opening ceremony, the architectural beauty of the stadium and 
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the multitude of medals won by Chinese athletes helped China successfully pass the test of 
modernity, achieving the peak of hope thanks to a surge in economic growth.“ 70  
Sport is a vital player in the clash of emotions because it has the power to emotionally 
influence large crowds. As Moïsi puts it, „victories achieved in the stadium may raise the 
mood of an entire nation for a short while and influence significantly the rise of national 
trust.“ 71 The emotionality of sport then serves more than just entertaining value. 
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2. THE DRIFT OF OLYMPIC GAMES TOWARDS EMERGING COUNTRIES 
In recent years, many western countries have become increasingly concerned with the 
ethical and political problems surrounding mega-events hosted by emerging countries 
whereas their own motivation to host mega-events seems to be declining. It is therefore 
necessary to study phenomena surrounding sports mega-events, especially in the light of 
recent developments where most upcoming events are going to be hosted by emerging 
powers. Before the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games, all Games (with the exception of Mexico 
1968) were hosted by developed rich western countries. Since then however, western 
countries have become less motivated to host mega-events claiming the lack of both 
political and public support and also financial problems. Emerging countries on the other 
hand, see opportunities to advertise their greatness and gain international interest. Some 
believe that future mega-events can only be hosted by emerging powers with authoritarian 
governments because they can ignore financial dilemmas and public opinion more easily 
than the developed democracies of the west. Olympic ideals and authoritarian regimes 
however do not go hand in hand. 
In this chapter, I present my main hypotheses for the research question why international 
sport is moving to emerging countries and explain them one by one in theory. In the next 
chapter, the same hypotheses will be tested empirically. The aim of this chapter therefore is 
to examine the theoretic background of my chosen hypotheses and to determine the 
variables which could be considered most instrumental for a successful bid. I have opted to 
cover only the Olympic Games and discard other sports mega-events for this research 
because the Olympics are the biggest, most relevant and most stable data producing of the 
bunch. This also makes for a reasonable amount of data considering the limitations of this 
thesis. 
There have been several studies on factors which determine the outcome of Olympic bids. 
In a study published in 2004, Swart and Bob identified factors such as accountability, 
political support, relationship marketing, ability, infrastructure, bid team composition, 
communication and exposure, and existing facilities as decisive for a successful bid. 
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Westerbeek, Turner and Ingerson presented similar factors in 2002 and Feddersen, 
Maennig, Zimmermann empirically tested these factors in 2008.
72
 However, they only 
considered factors related to economics and specific bids and their results mostly served the 
interest of potential future applicant cities. This research has a different approach: besides 
wider economic factors, political and psychological factors are also considered. The 
outcome should provide new interesting insights to international relations and social 
studies. The main hypotheses are the following: 
1) Economic and market mechanisms (IV1). Sports mega-events are global products in 
search of new markets and emerging countries win bids because of it. Also, larger 
economies from new-rich emerging countries are not deterred by the heightened 
price tag and win bids because of it. 
2) Political regime (IV2). It is easier to host mega-events in less free regions. Less 
democratic countries are more likely to win bids. 
3) Geopolitical aspirations (IV3). Geopolitical goals are pursued when bidding for 
hosting a sports mega-event. The bigger these aspirations are, the more eager the 
country is to host a mega-event. Countries with clear geopolitical goals dedicate 
more to the bidding process and win bids as a result. 
4) Corruption (IV4). It is easier to host mega-events in more corrupt systems. 
Countries with higher corruption levels are more likely to win bids and because of 
the corruption of sports organizations, bids are won with the help of bribes. 
2.1 Economic and market mechanisms 
The most common excuse for not hosting or withdrawing a bid includes concerns over high 
costs and fears over benefits. When asked for opinions on the subject of why the Olympic 
Games are moving away from the developed West, most sports officials bring out 
escalating costs of the Games as their first argument.
73
 In this sub-chapter I examine 
different economic factors and financially interested parties that might determine the drift 
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towards emerging countries. I come to the conclusion that the Olympic Games cost as 
much because the apparent pursuit for cost-effectiveness is overshadowed by reputational 
motives. Heightened price of these reputational motives only makes sense to very large 
economies and fast developing countries. The Games could be managed at lower costs but 
it is government pride, window-dressing and often exaggerated improvements to 
infrastructure which inflate the final costs. Nominal GDP size of bidding countries might be 
considered as a factor. The most feasible economic explanation remains the one which 
considers the Olympic Games as global products in search of new markets. 
First, financially interested parties must be identified. The main interest groups for hosting 
the Olympic Games according to Preuss are the regional grouping of the IOC members, 
host governments, politicians of the host city, local construction industry and the television 
network.
74
 IOC members who come from the same country, region or continent as 
candidate cities might have personal interests to promote the corresponding bids.
75
 Host 
governments are usually the major financers of bidding campaigns (and, upon winning the 
bid, the Olympic Games) and have the most to win and the most to lose reputation-wise in 
hosting the Games. Politicians of the host city, and the host nation, are promoting a global 
city, stimulating local economy and boosting personal image. The local construction 
agency is hoping to attain major contracts for building Olympic-related sites. The television 
network is hoping for increased viewer numbers and uplifted profits. On top of that, we can 
add other interested parties like local restaurant, hotel and business owners. What unites all 
these parties is the expectation of profit, including, to variable extent, the promise of 
material gains. Whether evident or not, the dichotomous “profit versus loss” rationale is 
deeply rooted into the mindsets of all parties involved in the staging of the Olympic Games. 
And as Preuss suggests, hosting the Olympics can make these interested parties become 
winners or losers depending on whether the Games affect the image of the city positively or 
negatively and whether the Games were run at a financial surplus or deficit.
76
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Concerns about the financial outcome of the Olympic Games is especially evident from 
1960s onward when 1964 Tokyo Olympic Games raised the bar with Games-related 
improvements to infrastructure which led to higher costs. Since then, becoming a financial 
winner or loser has become one of the main issues when considering hosting, especially 
amongst developed countries. Despite of concerns, however, Olympic Games and other 
mega-events are still seen by many as “vehicles for neo-liberal ambitions of the state, 
facilitating its ties with private interests”77. Economic opportunities that are embedded in 
the Games are therefore supposed to be most tempting for (mainly liberal) states and 
private companies in pursuit of material goals. 
First, hosting the Olympic Games is considered by cities and states to boost tourism 
revenues. “For cities seeking to be competitive this rationale supports the trend toward 
consumption-based development, which first requires the financing of a tourist-friendly 
landscape”.78 Olympics are perfectly suited for such purposes as they involve 
improvements to city image and infrastructure. In fact, the whole country, and not just the 
host city, is expected to profit from increased tourism. Furthermore, when looking for 
means of international advertisement of the city and country, hosting the Olympics can be 
in some ways considered a bargain. Andranovich, Burbank and Heying point out that “city 
leaders see the Olympic Games in strategic terms, providing opportunities to gain regional, 
national, and international media exposure at low cost.”79 Both consumption based 
development and promotional effects are stressed and pursued already in the phase of 
Olympic bidding. The submitted bid documents themselves are according to Lauermann 
simultaneously “boosterish (written as a demonstration of technical expertise and a 
rhetorical appeal to win) and speculative (written to propose future urban investments)”80 In 
this context, however, it is not evident that the Olympic Games are necessarily to be labeled 
as “vehicles for neo-liberal ambitions”. On the contrary, I suggest that boosting tourism and 
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gaining international media exposure are objectives more coveted by emerging countries 
regardless of their economic regime and ties to private interests. 
Private and liberal interests can not be neglected or underestimated though. Billions of 
dollars are spent and generated by the IOC with every Olympic Games. In an economic 
sense, the Olympic Games and its ideology can be seen as products. Preuss claims that 
“…the Olympic aura, nourished by the Olympic ideals” creates a globally valid and unique 
ideology which “is basis for the power, the financial resources and the lasting existence of 
the IOC.”81 The IOC can therefore be portrayed as a franchiser who sells the Olympic 
Games as a product to the local Organizing Committee for the Olympic Games (OCOG) 
and their mutual business is regulated by the Host City contract. The main product on sale, 
therefore, is not a material one, but the appeal of the Olympic trademark and the reputation 
of the Games and of the IOC. Potential host cities and countries are willing to spend a lot of 
resources for acquiring the image and a place on the world stage provided by the Olympic 
phenomenon. In fact, “..the OCOG pays the IOC a share of the Games surplus and all 
marketing revenues and finances a major part of the Games in order to receive the rights to 
host the Games and make use of the Olympic Rings”82. A similar deal is made between the 
IOC and its corporate sponsors. In the period between 2009 and 2012, nine private 
corporations paid the IOC a total of 950 million US dollars to become official Olympic 
partners.
83
 For that money, approximately 100 million USD each, they got exclusive 
worldwide rights to use the Olympic symbols in their advertisement campaigns. But even 
more importantly, the Olympic Partner (TOP) program sponsors are granted the rights to 
establish exclusive categories which means that other companies specialized in the same 
categories as the TOP sponsors are excluded from advertising their products in any ways 
associated with the Olympic Games, the IOC and all the national Olympic Committees 
(NOCs) around the world. For example, Coca-Cola is one of the TOP sponsors and holds 
the exclusive category in non-alcoholic drinks. That means all other soft-drinks producers 
are prohibited to be shown in Olympic broadcasts, use the Olympic symbols, market their 
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products at Olympic venues and start partnerships with the IOC or any of the NOCs. 
Naturally, this is a luxury only a handful of companies in the world can afford. Interest of 
those select few could therefore have some significance to the Olympic movement. I shall 
return to this possibility in the end of this sub-chapter. But beforehand, interests of the 
broadcasters should be examined. 
IOC generates most of its revenues from selling broadcasting rights, lion's share of which 
comes from selling North American TV rights,
84
 and therefore the role of Olympic 
broadcasting and the interests of the media industry are perhaps one the most important 
factors when considering economic influences to the Olympic Games. As the continuing 
success of the Olympic Games depends on its popularity and image, the importance of 
media coverage is also stressed in the Olympic Charter which states that “the IOC takes all 
necessary steps in order to ensure the fullest coverage by the different media and the widest 
possible audience in the world for the Olympic Games”85 This suggests that broadcasters, 
being the biggest financial contributors and serving vital importance to the IOC, might have 
some leverage on the IOC to influence some of its decisions. For example, the 2004 and 
2008 Olympics were not staged during American television prime time and “consequently, 
there was a strong preference among American broadcasters to have the 2012 Olympic 
Games in New York or at least in Rio de Janeiro or Havana”86. Despite their preference, 
however, the Games were awarded to London instead. Major broadcasting companies 
might have strong financial influences on the IOC but it would seem that it is not 
determinant in the decision making process and the outcome of Olympic bids. 
When considering the vastness of the event and all the different interests of various parties 
involved in the financing of the Olympic Games, according to Preuss, “it is impossible and 
even wrong to state the overall effect of different Olympics with a single surplus or 
deficit.”87 Usually when the final results of revenues and costs are presented, they also 
contain large scale investments not directly associated with the running of the Games. This 
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often leads to a negative end figure on the balance sheet and the assumption of a poorly 
done job on the behalf of the local OCOG. However, “when investments are eliminated 
from the final balance sheets of the OCOGs and operational expenditures are set against 
OCOG revenues”88, the revenues usually surpass the costs. In fact, Preuss found out that all 
the OCOGs under investigation in his book from 1972 to 2008 succeeded in making a 
financial profit.
89
 Therefore, it can be said that it is not running the Olympic Games which 
causes the high cost and public concern with financial decline but the additional costs of 
investments in infrastructure and city development. Preuss suggest that “from an economic 
and urban development perspective it only makes sense to bid for Olympic Games if the 
long term city development plans are in line with those of the needed Olympic structure.”90  
The previous suggests that for developed countries, with already existing high level 
infrastructure, hosting the Games would be more profitable. For the potential host cities in 
developing countries, on the other hand, “financing the Games is less difficult than 
overcoming an infrastructure which frequently does not live up to the Olympic demands”.91 
How is it then that the developed western countries are still more precautious than the 
emerging countries when it comes to the final costs of hosting the Olympic Games? 
Conventional explanations for not hosting or withdrawing a bid that blame high costs 
therefore seem inaccurate in reality and insufficient in theory to explain the whole situation. 
If one wishes to employ economic factors to describe the drift of international sports 
towards emerging countries, perhaps it is more reasonable to turn one´s attention to global 
interests of the IOC and its corporate sponsors instead. 
Due to aforementioned relations with TOP sponsors and broadcasters, the IOC can be seen 
as a global monopoly. Holding all the rights of a global phenomenon is inherent only to few 
(besides the IOC perhaps only FIFA is comparable). Volker Eick writes about FIFA, but 
the same can be said about the IOC: “The (contractual) relationships between all 
stakeholders involved are shaped by FIFA’s [and the IOC´s] ability to offer its 
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monopolized product.”92 In the case of the IOC, the monopolized product is the Olympic 
Games and all things related to Olympics are regulated by the IOC. The monopoly is 
further maintained “…by regulating the competition between the big players in the sports 
and media industry in order to allow for greater revenues to be /…/ redistributed to its 
member associations.”93 The revenues of Olympic Games are distributed between OCOG, 
NOC of the hosting country and the IOC, which also funds NOCs and IFs. Thus, the city 
and the country government do not receive any direct revenues from hosting the Olympic 
Games. The financial revenues that hosts can hope for, therefore, must come from a Games 
generated economic boost and increased tourism. Developed countries usually already have 
high-level economy and tourism rates and consequently have potentially less to win from 
hosting in economic terms.  
Finally, we are left with a concept that sees sports mega-events as global products in search 
of new markets. Kevin Wamsley claims that “the fundamental marketing strategy of the 
IOC in the last quarter of the 20
th
 century has been to amplify its importance to all peoples 
of the world.”94 IOC´s influence in the developed world is already strong and the drift of 
Olympic Games towards emerging countries could be explained as IOC´s expansion to new 
markets. It is also in the interests of TOP sponsors since “the Games bring a captive 
audience, billions of viewers, to corporate sponsors that want to increase their market 
shares around the globe.”95 The new market hypothesis will be further discussed in the 
empirical part of this thesis. 
2.2 Political regime 
The belief that political regime has some significance on attitudes towards hosting mega-
events and the outcome of bids has come to light in recent years. Mostly, it is an 
observational fact since many democracies are finding it progressively difficult to justify 
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the need for hosting mega-events while more and more non-democratic states are winning 
bids and declaring interest towards hosting future events. Hosting a global festival like the 
Olympic Games entails big promises and great responsibility on the behalf of city and 
country governments. According to Robert Dahl, it is inherent to democratic regimes that 
officials are perceived to live up to their obligations and if they fail to do so, they can be 
held accountable by the voters through not being re-elected.
96
 Democratic leaders, 
therefore, are to some extent dependent on public opinion and vulnerable to public 
opposition and demonstrations. Authoritarian leaders, on the other hand, are less restricted 
by concerns such as human rights violations and problems with housing, homelessness and 
basic freedoms in relation to the organizing of the Olympic Games. 
The former FIFA Secretary General Jérôme Valcke stated during the 2014 World Cup 
Local Organizing Committee news conference in Rio de Janeiro that the Football World 
Cup is difficult to organize under conditions where different people, movements and 
interests are involved and that “less democracy is sometimes better for organizing a World 
Cup”.97 Considering the similar nature and global scope of the World Cup and the Olympic 
Games, the same could be said about the latter. According to Nelson and Cottrell, “the idea 
is that democratic leaders are expected to exercise power in a manner that is transparent and 
subject to oversight through institutions, the media, and the legal system.”98 Therefore, it is 
supposedly easier to host mega-events in regions with less democratic regimes where 
regulatory mechanisms of different institutions operating on different levels of power have 
significantly lower or no effect on the final decisions of the government. Authoritarian 
countries are therefore, in a sense, more free in their actions to push through the necessary 
legislation needed to host mega-events, face less domestic opposition and are more likely to 
win bids because of it. 
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Rule 50 of the Olympic Charter gives the IOC Executive Board the power to determine all 
principles and conditions concerning publicity and advertising and prohibits all kinds of 
political, religious or racial demonstrations and propaganda in any Olympic sites, venues or 
other areas.
99
 This ultimately means that the IOC has the power to influence hosting 
countries´ domestic policies. Lenskyj states that “such guarantees can only be made 
through enacting legislation that suspends the basic right to freedom of speech and to 
freedom of public assembly that characterizes a democratic society.”100 Therefore, hosting 
the Olympic Games poses a threat to basic democratic values and naturally spurs some 
resistance in developed democratic states. In less democratic countries, however, these 
issues are not as vital and do not imply major changes to the existing order of how things 
are normally done. 
Another obstacle for democracies is the importance of free liberal press which also covers 
potential risks involved in staging a mega-event. The press, which frequently writes about 
financial speculations, human rights issues and other problems related to the Olympic 
Games, could be considered influential to forming public and official opinions. This is 
especially evident in the local press of free countries. In developed democratic countries 
where freedom of press and public freedoms are normally at higher levels, negative 
coverage is more likely to occur and can have a significant impact. In authoritarian states, 
on the other hand, censorship and different forms of propaganda can aid the officials to gain 
more public support. Some authors also blame the IOC for trying to manipulate with the 
media and treating media representatives and Olympic journalists favorably because it is 
interested in positive coverage. Positive image is the IOC´s best-selling product and 
influencing journalists to keep that reputation flawless can therefore be considered an 
important task. Different means of media manipulation do not generate nearly as much 
controversy in less democratic countries. It would then seem even logical for the IOC to 
prefer autocracies as hosts in order to better guide media coverage and safeguard its 
positive image. However, this approach creates an inner conflict for the IOC because the 
core values of Olympism are those not commonly affiliated with authoritarian regimes. 
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Furthermore, awarding the Games to non-democracies always raises questions about the 
integrity of the Olympic ideals and therefore still damages the image of the Olympic 
Games. In 2008, Freedom House insisted “on a new standard for awarding the Games, one 
that requires countries to be democratic and to respect basic human rights”.101 Although 
seemingly an adequate suggestion, it has so far been neglected by the IOC. 
The Olympic Charter states fundamental principles of Olympism as its core values. These 
values emphasize social responsibility and also include demands for securing enjoyment of 
a number of rights and freedoms without any kind of discrimination.
102
 In theory then, the 
IOC should be very critical towards less democratic hosts. On paper and in rhetoric it is 
doing just that by requiring all the NOCs and OCOGs to comply with the Olympic 
Charter.
103
 However, the IOC lacks real power to hold host countries accountable to the 
Olympic Charter. It would seem that the IOC is a bit naive when it comes to the 
disciplinary power that the Olympics supposedly have on non-democratic regimes. 
Although the host country has to open up to the world and face global political criticism, it 
does not mean that the regime itself would democratize in the process. In fact, the effects 
could be the exact reverse when an autocracy manages to apply the Olympics to legitimize 
itself and prove the systems efficiency. In the case of 2014 Winter Olympic Games in 
Sochi, Russian democracy index dropped from 5.02 (in 2006 when the bid for hosting the 
Games was submitted) to 3.39 in 2014
104
 and Russian approval for president Putin 
increased from 54% to 83%
105
 after the success of the Olympics and the annexation of 
Crimea.  
Olympic critics like Lenskyj find that the so called Olympic industry itself poses a general 
threat to free press, to freedom of assembly and to democratic decision making. In this 
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light, one can claim that the Olympics and autocracies make natural allies. Also, when 
considering revenue generation “…it would not serve Olympic industry purposes, most 
notably the interests of its global corporate sponsors, to exclude any country on negative 
social impacts or human rights grounds…”106. The ideology of the IOC would then be not 
as fundamental to the Games and terms like Olympism and Olympic spirit, which Lenskyj 
calls pseudo religious, would be used “to evoke feelings of universal excitement and 
belonging, while the less savory profit-making motives are concealed.”107 Although these 
motives exist, I would suggest that the IOC is genuine in its pursuit for promoting universal 
values but it fails to make hosts accountable for following them. As a result authoritarian 
host are constantly finding ways to go around the rules and incorporate their own agenda in 
the staging of the Olympic Games. 
Holger Preuss says that the Olympic Games were used in earlier times to “demonstrate the 
superiority of political regime” and in recent years the motivation for hosting the Olympics 
has come from the need to show the world major changes in the country.
108
 These changes, 
however, refer mostly to recent economic advances or new political aspirations and not 
significant changes in the regime. The old rationale of power and regime demonstration 
through the staging of the Olympic Games still stands. 
2.3 Geopolitical aspirations 
Although seemingly apolitical, sports mega-events have in some ways become hostage to 
political aspirations – they always conceal geopolitical attitudes of the hosting nation. 
Olympic Games and the use of geopolitics is mostly attributed to the middle of the 20th 
century, when the Games were first used by different regimes in attempts to prove their 
superiority to others (most notably in 1936 Berlin, also labelled as the Nazi-Olympics) and 
later during the Cold War, when the Games served as contained battlefields for the ongoing 
confrontations between the West and the East. Geopolitical and biopolitical rationales were 
implemented in many forms, from displaying technical skills and counting medals to 
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national doping programs and boycotts, in order to display the host country, its system, land 
and people as unique and supreme. These goals supposedly lost their importance for hosts 
with the end of the East-West conflict in the 1980s. Holger Preuss, for one, believes that 
„the Olympic Games have since hardly been used as a political instrument at all.”109 
Immanuel Wallerstein on the other hand finds that „geopolitics has never been absent from 
the Games.”110 I agree with Wallerstein and believe that geopolitical aspirations are still 
evident and of utmost importance when considering hosting the Olympic Games. Although 
these goals are to some extent characteristic to all hosts, they seem to matter more to 
emerging countries. I argue that geopolitical motives incite emerging countries to be more 
interested in hosting mega-events than developed countries. 
First, geopolitical features already appear in the bidding stage. In their pursuit of winning, 
competing cities all try to outdo each other, offer more and increase their costs but gain 
very little in return since everybody does the same. A popular move is to emphasize 
regional and global importance the Games would hold on each host: be it the rise of a new 
region, bridging different worlds or the revival of a familiar area. Also, it is often thought to 
be an advantage if the bidding city is located on a different continent as the previous host 
for the sake of diversity. Putting the location of the event in the spotlight and playing some 
geopolitical cards is therefore very important in the bidding process.  
As it turns out, all the bidding cities, and not just winners, can harvest the image boosting 
effects of the Olympics. A certain element of bluffing is therefore included in the bidding 
process because cities can gain governmental support, heightened attention and improved 
image already by just bidding. This may cause a free-rider mentality dilemma where 
bidders might not want to actually win the bid.
 111
 Some emerging countries might see that 
as an opportunity to get worldwide publicity and soft power gains at a lower price, although 
they must be prepared for negative international attention and possible critique as well. 
Giulianotti warns about soft disempowerment which “may occur when the attempt to gain 
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soft power backfires, so that influence and prestige are undermined rather than 
enhanced.”112 In addition, to rule out free-riding, IOC has prohibited international 
promotion during the applicant phase and also demands a non-refundable fee from all 
applicants. This, however, does not stop potential hosts from going head to head and 
including geopolitical motives in their campaigns. 
Additionally, the bidding process can be seen as a geopolitical confrontation line between 
different countries and cultures. Wallerstein wrote about the host city elections of 2016 
Summer Olympic Games, where Rio de Janeiro was announced the winner ahead of 
Madrid, Tokyo and of Chicago, and argued for a geopolitical rationale behind that decision 
which favored Brazil as the representative of South. He claimed it was a symbolic loss 
especially for the United States, as the leader of North, by saying that „losing a vote on an 
Olympic site is not as bad as having U.S. bases in Afghanistan overrun by Taliban, but it’s 
part of the same picture.”113 
Secondly, “every host city of the Olympic Games, or any other mega-event, operates within 
its own complex and contested geopolitical histories”114. Since the Olympics provide 
means and even encourage hosts to display the history, culture, people and nature of the 
country, it is only natural to find geopolitical meaning in the Olympic narratives created in 
the staging of the Olympic Games. Especially revealing in this sense are the opening and 
closing ceremonies. In 2008, for example, China managed to stun the world and work up its 
image with the massive opening ceremony for Beijing Olympic Games showing its rich 
history, dominance in the region and growing global importance. The Olympic torch relay 
can also be used to mark places of importance. Such was the case with Sochi 2014 where 
the Olympic flame reached the Arctic circle, outskirts of Russia, the bottom of lake Baikal 
and even space in an attempt to present Russian grandeur and presence in all geographically 
and politically significant sites. Olympics can also be seen as historically consistent 
features inherent to potential hosts past and present. Dawson suggests that ongoing 
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campaigns of developing areas “have historical antecedents that were part of a transnational 
phenomenon.”115 By trying to host smaller events like Pan-American Games or 
Commonwealth Games these cities and states have tried to come out of the periphery and 
claim their regional dominance and international importance. Now they are ready for the 
next level which means applying for the Olympics.  
Thirdly, the Olympic Games represent an opportunity to measure and demonstrate the 
success and modernity of nations. According to Black and Peacock, these are the most 
commonly pursued objectives of hosts from rising developmental states. They present four 
“demonstration effects” characteristic to emerging Asian countries´ in regards to hosting 
sporting mega-events: the “blend of intense nationalism and eager internationalism” 
inherent both to mega-events and to developmental states’ pursuit of modernity; “direct 
government involvement in major sporting events”; “the willingness of governments to 
allocate massive public expenditures to the hosting of such events”; and motivation from 
regional rivalry.
116
 Intense nationalism and internationalism combined with regional rivalry 
provide a perfect platform for the emergence of geopolitics. The urge for becoming a 
regional leader, proving its modernity and establishing oneself internationally then become 
main goals of an emerging country. And “hosting sporting mega-events legitimizes and 
ritually represents the truly modernized arrival of a (developmental-turned-developed) 
state”117 Similar conditions of rivalry for both regional dominance and international 
influence were also more distinctly present in Europe in the 20
th
 century. Whereas 
geopolitics might not be as important for European countries from the end of the Cold War, 
it could be said that the actions of emerging countries today are reflecting the golden age of 
geopolitics and sport in Europe a few decades back. 
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Fourth, physical location of the Games, its venues and related practices of gentrification 
and urban development often reveal geopolitical aspirations of the host country. The space 
surrounding Olympic sites is subject to extensive improvements to meet Olympic standards 
and portray the city in as good light as possible. Structures and the overall image of the city 
is meant to represent the best features of the region, country and government regime. 
Hosting the Olympics in somewhat peripheral or conflictual locations can strengthen the 
stronghold and provide international legitimacy for the ruling regime in the region. Sochi 
Olympic Games, for example, helped Russia reinforce its presence in the problematic 
regions of North-Caucasus and Abkhazia. In Vancouver 2010, interests of First Nation 
groups were largely dismissed despite their efforts to draw “significant public attention to 
the city as a site of colonial violence, both past and present”118. In softer cases, leaders of 
geographically isolated regional cities in relatively wealthy countries hope the Games 
would put them “on the map”.119 
In many cases special legislation is adopted to allow for quick changes in city 
infrastructure, raise the power of law enforcement agencies and limit people´s freedom of 
movement, - protest and –self-expression.120 In the process of preparing for the Sochi 
Olympics, the Russian State Duma passed “the Olympic Law which provides the legal 
framework for transforming Sochi into an Olympic city and, importantly, lays out the 
process governing land acquisition for the purpose of building Olympic facilities”121 
Consequently, the state can freely shape the Olympic landscape to match the concepts and 
images intended for the world to see. Many Olympic critics write about negative effects of 
such behavior of states addressing issues like criminalization of homelessness, destruction 
of low-income housing and forceful gentrification of parts of town.
122
 It is all done to leave 
an impression of the host as a high functioning, clean and friendly city and country. 
                                                 
118
 Springer, Simon. „Olympic Violence: Memory, Colonialism, and the Politics of Place“, ACME: An 
International E-Journal for Critical Geographies, Vol. 14 Issue 2, 2015, p631-638 . Here p 633. 
119
 Dawson, 2011. Here p 791. 
120
 Toohey, Kristine . Taylor, Tracy. „Surveillance and securitization: A forgotten Sydney Olympic legacy“, 
International Review for the Sociology of Sport, 47: 324, January 2012. p 324 - 337. Here pp 324, 332. 
121
 Foxall, 2015. Here p 625. 
122
 Lenskyj, 2008; Springer, 2015. 
42 
 
However, this geopolitical make-up is often applied by force and can have devastating 
effects on less fortunate native and local residents. 
Finally, the Olympic Games as a celebration of the nations “can clearly operate as a force 
that provides considerable cultural reinforcement for those who wish to preserve older 
structures and boundaries — and, indeed, to (re)construct new ones.”123 This can be seen in 
geopolitical self-determination and the use of the Olympics as a symbol of high 
performance to rebrand the country´s image and to construct national legacies and heroes. 
Host governments of emerging countries are often interested in portraying themselves in 
ways to become accepted as members of a certain geopolitical entity. Azerbaijan and 
Turkey, for example, have applied many times to host the Olympic Games and other mega-
events with intentions of showcasing their “Europeanness”. 
2.4 Corruption  
The hosts for Olympic Games are selected by the members of the IOC in a secret ballot. 
Over the years, many scandals have been revealed involving the IOC, OCOGs, NOCs and 
politicians of bidding countries which suggests that corruptive practices might have 
significant effect on the bidding outcome. Although the IOCs official policy is to fight all 
forms of corruption, and it has gone through reform to minimize all possibilities of it, 
corruption allegations still arise from time to time. Corruption on three different levels 
should therefore be examined: on transnational level, discussing problems with the IOC; on 
national level, examining the corruption within candidate states; and in terms of media bias. 
First, the corruption of the governing institution of all things “Olympic” should be 
examined. There are currently 99 members to the IOC and it is up to them to elect the hosts 
for the Olympic Games. Influencing those 99 people to favor a certain bid has therefore 
been a common practice amongst bidding countries. Up until 1999 before IOC reforms it 
was quite usual for candidate cities to invite IOC members to come visit the city and then 
treat them like royalty in hopes to secure votes. This approach grew as far as giving each 
IOC member personal evaluations. Douglas Booth describes how “acquiring personal 
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information about IOC members became essential after Los Angeles [1984]” and adds that 
“candidate cities compiled dossiers describing IOC members’ personal characteristics, 
foibles, likes, dislikes, preferences, indifferences, interests and concerns.”124 Based on this 
information, each member would then receive special treatment. “Pandering to IOC 
members became the recipe for winning hosting rights” 125 and many host city candidates 
pursued friendly relationships with as many IOC members as possible. Besides royal 
treatment and nourishing the members´ egos, lavish gifts, cash payments and special favors 
to the IOC, its members and their families has also been common. Such cases have been 
discovered in relation to a succession of Olympic Games. To name a few: prior to the 
election of Nagano as host for the 1998 Winter Olympic Games the president of Japanese 
Olympic Committee donated 20 million US dollars to the Olympic Museum, the members 
of Sydney 2000 and Salt Lake City 2002 organizing committees were accused of bribing 
the members of the IOC and providing scholarships and medical services to them or their 
families.
126
 Relying on such facts, one could almost suggest that votes and ultimately the 
hosting rights for the Olympic Games can be bought. One explanation of the Olympic drift 
towards emerging countries could therefore simply be that newly-rich countries are out 
image-shopping and the bids are won with bribes. Although I do not believe such a grim 
scenario to be true, I have to acknowledge that corruptive notions in the Olympic 
movement can affect bid outcomes.  
In 1999, following several corruption scandals in relation to awarding the 2002 Winter 
Games to Salt Lake City and in an attempt to clear its reputation, IOC adopted new rules 
governing the designation of Olympic Games host cities. Amongst 50 proposed rule 
changes was the adoption of a new two-phase candidature process which relied on the 
Candidature Acceptance Working Group´s technical evaluations of applicant cities and 
condemned IOC members’ visits to the candidate cities.127 “Thus the corruption crisis 
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forced the IOC to shift the balance of different forms of power in the bidding process from 
reward power to technical power”128 Or so it would seem. Although the gathered technical 
information provides an objective ranking list of the applicant cities, it has little effect on 
determining the winner. For example, “…the IOC’s Candidature Acceptance Working 
Group which assessed applicant cities for 2016 ranked [the final winner] Rio de Janeiro the 
lowest of the final four candidates…” 129 Some critics also suggest that most of the “50 
reforms” were quite trivial and that the whole reform process can be considered as merely a 
public relations trick to save the image of the IOC and its corporate sponsors.
130
 Others 
point out that despite the increased importance of technical evaluation and regulations 
limiting the interactions between IOC members and representatives of applicant cities, 
plotting and scheming still continues. Booth writes about the use of third parties and 
middlemen, who supposedly have influence on the members of the IOC, and plans for 
secret public relations campaigns against rivaling candidate cities.
131
 Therefore, problems 
still exist. 
I would suggest, nevertheless, that the reforms were successful in terms of highlighting the 
IOCs problems with corruption, deeming it unacceptable and making IOC members and 
potential future hosts very cautious when considering engaging in somewhat corruptive 
practices. However, the corruption level of potential host countries might alter the extent of 
this effect. It could be suggested that it is easier to host the Olympic Games in more corrupt 
systems and that countries with higher corruption levels are more likely to win bids because 
the possibility of them using corruptive approaches in the bidding process remains higher 
despite the reforms. 
Kevin Wamsley says that despite of “a long history of corrupt practices” and other scandals 
involving doping and judging fiascos “the IOC has relinquished little control over thought 
and practice in global sport.”132 Some of it can be attributed to biased media representation 
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and corruptive practices in the relations between the IOC, host governments, private 
companies and the media. Helen Lenskyj suggests that governments and private 
entrepreneurs as well as big media companies themselves are interested in controlling 
Olympic-related news. She says that for a long period of time “bribery and corruption in the 
bid process largely escaped media scrutiny, despite the whistle-blowing efforts of a small 
number of journalists.”133 There are examples of paying journalists for “sympathetic 
articles”, publishing pro-Olympic books and “invitations to lavish parties held by bid 
committees.”134 According to Lenskyj, journalists have also avoided producing negative 
news in fear of being denied accreditation for the Olympic Games by the IOC.
135
Positive-
sided coverage is also important for the large broadcasting companies who have invested 
millions or even billions in the Olympics. With stakes as high as that, bias is easily formed. 
Groups interested in controlling Olympic related media might therefore prefer emerging 
countries as hosts because similar practices could be more easily implemented in countries 
with lower levels of media freedom.  
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3. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
The main objective of the empirical analysis is to explore bids for the Olympic Games, 
determine instrumental factors for winning bids and empirically test the established 
hypotheses. Let us start with examining some historical background of Olympic bidding. 
Feddersen and colleagues describe 5 phases of changes in the total number of applicant 
cities.
136
 In the first two phases of their categorization, spanning the years from 1896 to 
1968, the Games were a lot smaller and less costly and the number of applicants was 
influenced more by reputational factors rather than economic ones (apart from being in the 
“wealthy club of nations” that could afford it). The first phase (1896 – 1945) was led by the 
influence of the founders of modern Olympics who at first preserved the event for higher 
class male participants of the western culture and the number of applicants was therefore 
low. With the growing popularity of the Olympic Games and strong action on part of 
female and working class athletes to be eligible for participation, modifications were made 
to the Olympic movement which allowed it to become the global phenomenon it is today. 
By opening up to new sports and participants while providing political outputs to different 
ideologies, the second phase (1945 – 1968) after World War II brought along a significant 
increase of interest in hosting the Games. Then, from 1960s, economy stepped in as one of 
the main determinants when considering hosting. First, it produced a decline as third phase 
kicked in with high costs of the 1964 Games acting as deterrent for some countries. These 
concerns were overcome in the 1980s after “the Games in Los Angeles and Seoul were 
regarded as financially successful”137 and the East–West conflict settled down. From the 
late 1980s to 2001, during the fourth phase (1989 – 2001), the number of applicant cities 
was once again high due to the end of the Cold War and rediscovered hope of winning both 
materially and in terms of image creation through the hosting of the Olympic Games. In 
2001, after a corruption scandal and changes in the election procedure, the fifth stage (2001 
– 2012) went into progress providing more transparency and therefore increasing interest to 
bid even further. I believe that the Olympic Games have now entered the sixth phase of 
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Olympic bidding which in ways reflects some previous phases. At one point, as the costs of 
hosting have once again increased, similarities with the fourth phase can be observed as the 
total number of bids is decreasing. On the other end though, similarities with the second 
phase are evident amongst emerging countries who have just reached new levels of 
development and wealth and are showing increasingly more interest towards hosting the 
Olympic Games. The phases of Olympic bidding are shown in Figure 1. 
Figure 1: Phases of Olympic bidding, Summer Olympic Games 
  
When comparing the total number of bids submitted by developed countries to those 
submitted by developing and emerging countries, it is noticeable that the number of bids is 
in decline for the developed world and on the rise for emerging countries. By today, 
bidding for the Olympics is no longer dominated by rich Western countries as the growing 
amount of bids submitted by less developed countries has leveled the field. Figure 2 and 
Table 1 illustrate these trends. 
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Figure 2: Total number of Olympic bids. 
 
Table 1: Bids by developed and emerging countries for Olympic Games 2008-2022 
  
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Developed country 29 51,8 51,8 51,8 
Emerging country 27 48,2 48,2 100,0 
Total 56 100,0 100,0  
 
3.1 Methodology 
Olympic Games as the biggest, most influential and most iconic global sporting festival 
was chosen for the assessment of current trends in international sport and politics. The 
Olympic Games are governed by the rules of the IOC and held biannually which means 
they provide constant and comparable data. The beginning of the drift of sports mega-
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events towards emerging countries was signaled by Beijing 2008 Olympic Games which 
was taken as a starting point of interest. The idea was to look at all the bids made for 
hosting the Games and test a selection of variables for their influence on winning. The 
Olympic Games host cities are elected 7 years prior to the Games. However, for each 
bidding country, data from one year previous to the selection of hosts was gathered because 
this was the latest available data at the time the decisions were made. For example, data 
from the year 2000 was used for applicants competing for hosting 2008 Summer Olympic 
Games. 
All together 56 bids for hosting 8 Summer and Winter Olympic Games in the years from 
2008 to 2022 were investigated. Values for 9 different variables were then gathered for 
each of these bids. Olympic bid outcome was taken as the dependent variable to which a 
value of 1 was given when the bid was successful and a value of 0 when the bid was 
unsuccessful. There were 8 winning bids and 48 losing bids. Independent variables were 
selected to measure characteristics attributed to one of the four hypothesis. Table 2 displays 
the hypotheses, independent variables and their measurements used in this research. The 
use of these variables is further explained in the following sub-chapter.   
Table 2: Hypotheses, variables and measures. 
Hypothesis  Independent Variable Measure 
Economic and market 
mechanisms 
GDP (nominal) Scale, interval 
 Market mechanisms Binary (1=new market; 0=not a new market) 
Political regime Polity score Scale, interval (-10…+10) 
 Freedom index Scale, interval (1…7) 
 Freedom of press Scale, interval (0…100) 
Geopolitical aspirations Geopolitical aspirations Binary (1=existent; 0=not existent) 
Corruption CPI Scale, interval (0…10) 
 
Observed corruption 
cases 
Binary (1=corruptive methods used; 0=no 
evidence of corruption) 
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Emerging countries were determined according to the classifications of IMF World 
Economic Outlook 2014. Countries referred to as developing and emerging market 
economies by the IMF were given the value of 1, developed countries were given the value 
of 0. 
Independent variables and their central tendencies were explored separately at first. Finally, 
bimodal logistic regression was performed to assess the combined effect of the independent 
variables on the bid outcome. SPSS Statistics was used for all the calculations. 
3.2 Variables explored separately 
The average differences between developed and emerging countries were examined first. 
Mean values of independent variables provided in Table 3 were later used to evaluate 
whether differences between bid winners and losers could be rather attributed to developed 
or emerging countries. 
Table 3: Descriptive statistics of developed and emerging countries. 
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3.2.1 Economic and market mechanisms 
To assess the effect of economic and market mechanisms on the outcome of the Olympic 
bidding process, two variables were selected: economic capacity of the host country and 
being a new market for the Olympic Games. 
The first question of interest lies in whether a country’s economic might has an effect on 
the Olympic bid outcome. Comparison of bidding countries´ nominal GDP, measured in 
millions of USD, was used for this purpose. International Monetary Fund’s World 
Economic Outlook Database was used to provide the data.
138
  
Table 4 shows the comparison between descriptive statistics of 2008-2022 Olympic bids 
winners and losers nominal GDP values. Some differences between successful applicants 
and unsuccessful ones based on their GDP size were indeed noticeable. 
Table 4: Descriptive statistics of bid winners and losers nominal GDP. 
GDP (nominal) millions of USD 
Bid outcome Mean N Std. Deviation Median Maximum Minimum 
lost the bid 1420517,67 48 2801693,900 558390,50 14718575 1456 
won the bid 3044817,25 8 3409360,331 1443735,00 10380380 752523 
Total 1652560,46 56 2918230,071 639318,50 14718575 1456 
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook Database, October 2014; World Bank Databank. 
The mean GDP value of the winners is more than twice as high as the mean GDP value of 
losers (3 trillion USD for successful bids and 1,4 trillion USD for unsuccessful bids). 
Median GDP values of winners and losers differ even more so it could be stated that bigger 
economies generally have an advantage for winning Olympic bids. Additionally, a 
minimum GDP value needed for a successful bid emerged. Since the year 2000, no country 
with  GDP lower than 752 billion USD has been granted the right to host Olympic Games. 
Standard deviations though are very high which means that there are huge differences in 
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Databank http://databank.worldbank.org/data/home.aspx, viewed 04.02.2015. 
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GDP levels of different countries bidding for the Olympics and very high or very low 
figures might distort the values of central tendencies.  
Due to heavy skewness, the absence of a normal distribution and differences in sample 
sizes between the two groups, performing a t-test for the equality of means loses its power 
and can not be considered very trustworthy. The similarities of the groups of bid winners 
and losers become noticeable on the histograms (Figure 3). Both graphs have a positive 
skew and it is noticeable that arithmetic mean and median do not represent the most 
number of cases. The main difference between to two groups comes from the large number 
of losing bids (N=48) and a small number of winning bids (N=8). Despite the low number 
of cases, the relative amount of bids on the lower end of the scale is smaller on the winning 
side. 
 
Figure 3: Histograms, GDP values of losing and winning bid countries. 
 
Source: World Economic Outlook Database, October 2014; World Bank Databank. Graph by author. 
It can be concluded that there are differences in average GDP levels of Olympic bid 
winning and losing countries but they are not very significant. It can still be argued though 
that a country who wants to host the Olympic Games must have high GDP but that 
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differences in GDP do not translate to higher or lower probability for winning the bid. 
Lower GDP on the other hand can inhibit the chances of winning.  
Since GDP values are on the average higher amongst developed countries it is most likely 
that differences in GDP are not causing the drift towards emerging countries. 
 
Secondly, the hypothesis of IOCs expansion to new markets was investigated. All of the 56 
bids for hosting 2008 – 2022 Summer and Winter Olympic Games were evaluated as 
whether being a new market for the Olympic industry or not. All bidding cities from 
countries which had previously hosted at least one Summer or Winter Games were counted 
for as “not a new market”. Cities representing countries which had never held the Olympic 
Games before the year 2008 were considered “new markets”. Of the total 56 bids, 27 were 
determined as new markets and 29 as established old markets. Amongst the winning bids 
only 3 out of 8 were representatives of new markets and amongst losing bids there was an 
equal number of applicants representing new and old markets for the Olympic Games (see 
also Table 5).  
Table 5: Countries considered as new markets for the Olympic Games amongst winning 
and losing bids. 
Bid outcome Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
lost the bid Valid not a new market 24 50,0 50,0 50,0 
new market 24 50,0 50,0 100,0 
Total 48 100,0 100,0  
won the bid Valid not a new market 5 62,5 62,5 62,5 
new market 3 37,5 37,5 100,0 
Total 8 100,0 100,0  
 
There is a roughly equal number of applicants from countries that might be considered as 
new markets for the Olympic movement and from countries who have hosted the Games 
before. In the so called new era of the Olympic Games, being a “new market” does not 
seem to be an advantage for winning bids though. The hypothesis which explains the drift 
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of the Olympic Games towards emerging countries as a market mechanism and the IOCs 
expansion to new markets is therefore disproven.  
3.2.2 Political regime 
To assess the effects of political regime on the outcome of the Olympic bid process, three 
different variables were used: polity score, freedom index and freedom of press score. 
First, the effect of regime type was analyzed. Polity scores of the Polity IV project were 
used to determine differences between bid winners and losers based on their level of 
democracy. Polity IV provides a polity score ranging from -10 to +10 for each year and 
country. Countries with scores from -10 to -6 are considered autocracies, from -5 to 5 
anocracies and from 6-10 democracies. Only countries with the highest value of 10 are 
considered full democracies. 
Table 6 shows the comparison between descriptive statistics of 2008-2022 Olympic bids 
winners and losers polity scores.  
Table 6: Descriptive statistics of polity scores for Olympic bid losers and winners. 
Polity score 
Bid outcome Mean N Std. Deviation Median Range Minimum Maximum 
lost the bid 5,32 47 6,843 9,00 20 -10 10 
won the bid 4,75 8 7,382 8,00 17 -7 10 
Total 5,24 55 6,856 8,00 20 -10 10 
Source: The Polity IV dataset, Center for Systemic Peace, 2014. 
 
It could be noted that both mean values are below the boundary score of 6 required to be 
classified as a democracy which confirms the high interests of non-democracies to bid for 
the Olympic Games. Also, mean and median scores of the winners appear to be slightly 
lower which suggests that less democracy is better for winning bids. However, the 
minimum score for winning bids is higher than the minimum score for losing bids which 
allows to suggest the opposite. Furthermore, histograms of winning and losing bids (Figure 
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4) are very similar which suggest that the differences between the two groups are not very 
significant. Due to the absence of a normal distribution of the variable and differences in 
sample sizes, running a t-test for the equality of means would not provide meaningful 
results.  
Figure 4: Histograms: polity scores of bid losers and winners. 
 
Source: The Polity IV dataset, Center for Systemic Peace, 2014. Graph by author. 
Despite of the small differences between central tendencies, the data still provides 
knowledge which favors less democratic countries in the bid outcome. The main difference 
visible on the histograms is the relatively higher amount of countries with the highest 
possible polity score amongst losing bids as compared to winners. When countries are 
divided into democracies and non-democracies based on their polity scores, these 
tendencies become even more evident. Amongst the losing bids 70,2% could be categorized 
as democracies, whereas amongst the winning side the equivalent number was 62,5%. 
Additionally, the differences in minimum values become irrelevant because there were 25% 
of bids by countries considered to be autocracies (score -6 or lower) amongst the winning 
bids and only 21,3% bids by autocracies amongst losing bids. Furthermore, only 3 out of 8 
winning bids were those of countries considered to be full democracies. Therefore, less 
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democracy could be considered somewhat useful to the success of an Olympic bid. This 
also suggests that political regime may be considered as a factor which contributes to the 
Olympic drift since polity scores are remarkably lower amongst emerging countries. 
Secondly, freedom indexes and the freedom of press of bidding countries were investigated. 
Based on the gathered theoretical evidence it was expected that countries with lower 
freedom values would prove to be more successful in winning Olympic bids. Freedom 
House rates countries for their political rights and civil liberties on a 7 point scale (1 being 
the most free and 7 being the least free). For this analysis, each country’s values for 
political rights and civil liberties were combined and the arithmetic mean was used as the 
freedom index. Countries with index values from 1 to 2,5 were considered as being free, 
from 2,51 to 5,5 as being partly free and from 5,51 to 7 as not being free. For the freedom 
of press, scores provided by Freedom House were used which range from 0 (most free) to 
100 (least free). On the basis of the scores, countries were considered to have free press (0 
to 30), partly free press (31 to 60) or not to have free press (61 to 100). 
The descriptive statistics (Table 7) show a slight difference in favor of less free countries. 
All central tendencies of the winners are higher which refers to somewhat lower freedom 
levels in winning countries. The differences are bigger for the freedom of press. It could be 
presumed that less freedom, and particularly less freedom of press, is helpful for winning 
Olympic bids. Although the differences are very small and a look at the histograms (Figure 
5) and further examination of the data helps to clear the picture. 
Table 7: Descriptive statistics of freedom index and freedom of press for Olympic bid 
losers and winners. 
Bid outcome Freedom index 
Freedom of 
press 
lost the bid Mean 2,667 39,67 
N 48 48 
Std. Deviation 2,0299 25,850 
Median 1,500 28,00 
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won the bid Mean 3,188 46,75 
N 8 8 
Std. Deviation 2,5062 29,065 
Median 1,750 37,00 
Total Mean 2,741 40,68 
N 56 56 
Std. Deviation 2,0867 26,169 
Median 1,500 29,00 
Source: Freedom House Freedom in the World: Country Rankings 1972 – 2014; Freedom House Freedom of 
the Press: Scores and Status 1980 – 2015. 
 
Figure 5: Histograms: freedom index and freedom of press of bid losers and winners. 
Source: Freedom House Freedom in the World: Country Rankings 1972 – 2014; Freedom House Freedom of 
the Press: Scores and Status 1980 – 2015. Graphs by author. 
 
Histograms of freedom indexes show that countries considered as most free are the main 
bidders for Olympic Games. Their relative importance is much higher amongst the losing 
bids though. The winning side has winners on the both ends of the scale and does not seem 
to have any emerging groups based on their freedom levels. Interestingly, both winning and 
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losing sides have exactly 62,5% of countries who are classified as being free on the basis of 
the freedom index. This leads us to an assumption that less freedom does not have an effect 
on winning Olympic bids. More freedom on the other hand seems to be an inhibitory factor 
for winning. 
Similar things can be said about the freedom of press. The amount of bids with lower 
scores (meaning higher freedom of press) is characteristic to the losers in Olympic bidding 
whereas the winning side does not have significant distinguishable groups on the basis of 
press freedom. However, there were 56,3% of bids on the losing side and only 37,5% of 
bids on the winning side by countries considered to have free press (score values 30 or 
lower). The freedom of press therefore seems to have a negative effect on winning Olympic 
bids.  
It can be concluded that less freedoms does not have an effect on winning the bid, however 
more freedom seems to be detrimental for winning. The part of the hypothesis which states 
that it is easier to host Olympic Games in less free countries could therefore be considered 
true. This aspect also favors emerging countries and might contribute to the drift of hosting 
rights. 
3.2.3 Geopolitical aspirations 
Manifestations of geopolitical aspirations of the applicant countries were looked for in the 
reports of the IOC Evaluation Commission, the reports of the IOC Candidature Acceptance 
Working Group and in news media for each of the Olympic Games held between 2008 and 
2022. Five different indicators were chosen to mark the existence of geopolitical incentives 
for hosting the Games. Because some geopolitical motivations for hosting the Olympics are 
often revealed in the final preparation processes or during the actual Olympic Games, only 
aspects referring to geopolitical aspirations observable prior to winning hosting rights were 
included. Most evident geopolitical manifestations of the Olympic Games like the 
symbolism of the torch relay and opening ceremonies were therefore excluded. Also, mere 
urban development plans and publicity were not included because they are an inevitable 
part of every Olympics. The selected indicators were: 1) specific emphasize on regional and 
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local importance of the Games, 2) seeking regional dominance and/or international status, 
3) control over disputed areas, 4) geopolitical self-determination and 5) issues with forceful 
gentrification and land acquisition and/or the existence of special legislation to allow it. All 
the bids where then assessed on a binary basis and given a value of 1 when geopolitical 
aspirations were existent and a value of 0 when they were not existent. To classify for the 
“existent” group, at least one of the 5 indicators had to be met.  
Geopolitical incentives for hosting the Olympic Games were noted for 60% of all the cases. 
This confirms the importance of geopolitical rationales when deciding for submitting a bid 
for hosting the Olympics in the first place. Table 8 presents the differences between bid 
winners and losers. 
 
Table 8: Geopolitical aspirations of losers and winners of Olympic bids 
Bid outcome Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
lost the bid Valid No geopolitical aspirations 21 43,8 43,8 43,8 
Geopolitical aspirations 
noted 
27 56,3 56,3 100,0 
Total 48 100,0 100,0  
won the bid Valid No geopolitical aspirations 1 12,5 12,5 12,5 
Geopolitical aspirations 
noted 
7 87,5 87,5 100,0 
Total 8 100,0 100,0  
 
It is clearly evident that the existence of geopolitical aspirations is very characteristic to the 
winners of Olympic bids. Significant geopolitical themes could not have been attributed to 
only one out of eight successful bids. For non-successful bids, however, the number of 
applicants who had geopolitical aspirations in relation to hosting the Games was only 
slightly higher compared to ones who did not have such incentives. Furthermore, more than 
two indicators of geopolitical motives were noted on the average for winning bids. 
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Observed indicators of geopolitical aspirations for each of the bidding countries can be seen 
in the appendix. 
It can be concluded that the existence of strong geopolitical aspirations are instrumental to 
winning Olympic bids. I would suggest that for states geopolitical goals attribute a 
meaningful purpose and additional value to hosting the Olympic Games. It is the pursuit of 
these goals which makes them more enthusiastic about bidding and ultimately makes their 
bids more successful. Important is also the fact that geopolitical indicators were discovered 
for all the bids of emerging countries while amongst the bids of developed countries 
geopolitical aspirations were noted only for a quarter of cases. 
3.2.4 Corruption 
Two variables were used to analyze the possible effects of corruption on the outcome of 
Olympic bids. Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) provided by Transparency International 
was used to measure corruption of applicant countries and actual cases of corruption 
referring to certain bids were sought out to assess the use of corruptive means in relations 
with the IOC. 
First, Corruption Perceptions index was used to evaluate the possible effect of the 
corruption within bidding countries to the outcome of Olympic bids. CPI is presented on a 
scale from 0 to 10 and it measures local perceptions of corruption, rather than the real 
phenomena, in different countries around the world.
139
 On the scale, 0 refers to a country 
which is very corrupt and 10 to country which is considered to be very clean.
140
 It was 
presumed that more corrupt systems would prove to be more successful in winning bids for 
the hosting rights of the Olympic Games. Although the actual differences in CPI were 
rather small, descriptive statistics shown in Table 9 reveal that on the average bid-winning 
countries have slightly lower CPI scores which means that they are more corrupt. Because 
of heterogeneity of the applicant countries and outliers in the data, median values could be 
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 Lambsdorff, Johann Graf. „Background Paper to the 2000 Corruption Perceptions Index“, Transparency 
International (TI) and Göttingen University, September 2000. Here p 6. 
140
 In 2012, the scale was changed so that the values range from 0 to 100. Data for 2012 and 2014 was 
therefore divided by 10 to get a comparable dataset. 
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considered most suitable statistics to represent central tendencies of the variable. Median 
CPI of the losers was 6,4 against the winners 4,5. Therefore, it can be claimed that 
relatively more corrupt countries win Olympic bids. 
Table 9: Descriptive statistics, CPI of Olympic bid losers and winners. 
Corruption perceptions index 
Bid outcome Mean N Std. Deviation Median Range Minimum Maximum 
lost the bid 5,609 45 2,1056 6,400 7,3 1,9 9,2 
won the bid 5,388 8 2,6118 4,500 6,5 2,5 9,0 
Total 5,575 53 2,1624 6,100 7,3 1,9 9,2 
Source: Transparency International. 
Interestingly, in 2008 Feddersen and colleagues stated the exact opposite.
141
 Their research 
was based on the bids for Summer Olympic Games from 1992 to 2012. They too 
investigated the level of corruption as one variable and used CPI as measurement. The fact 
that this research covers more recent cases and produces different results can be seen as 
further proof for the drift of the Olympic Games towards emerging countries. 
Secondly, alleged corruption cases associated with the IOC were investigated. News media 
articles were followed over the course of one year in 2015 for any revealings of corruptive 
methods being used to secure votes for specific bids. Three different types of corruption 
were noticed: 1) bribery and expensive gifts, 2) use of middlemen, special deals and the 
influence of third parties 3) services to the IOC members and/or their families. Table 10 
summarizes the findings. For all observed cases, see the appendix. 
Table 10: Observed corruption cases of bid losers and winners. 
Bid outcome Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
lost the bid Valid No evidence of corruption 45 93,8 93,8 93,8 
Corruptive methods used 3 6,3 6,3 100,0 
Total 48 100,0 100,0  
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 Feddersen; Maennig; Zimmermann; 2008 
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won the bid Valid No evidence of corruption 3 37,5 37,5 37,5 
Corruptive methods used 5 62,5 62,5 100,0 
Total 8 100,0 100,0  
 
Corruptive methods were allegedly used only in relation to 8 bids, however. Despite the 
apparent connection between using corruptive methods and winning bids based on the 
descriptive statistics, these findings can not be considered very relevant for several reasons. 
First, alleged corruption is very hard to prove. Second, there is always more data for the 
winning bids and no one is usually bothered to reveal corruptive methods used in 
unsuccessful bids. Having that said, it was found that corruptive methods are still used in 
some cases by those who hope to win the right to host the Olympic Games. Furthermore, 
because the cases in this research are quite recent and corruption is sometimes exposed 
years later, the full extent of this variable might not be yet apparent. 
3.3 Regression analysis 
Binominal logistic regression was performed to determine the effects of the independent 
variables to the success of Olympic bids because of the binary nature of the dependent 
variable. The dependent variable used was the bid outcome (result) and the independent 
variables were the following: 
1) GDP (nominal) millions of USD (gdp) 
2) Market mechanisms (market) 
3) Polity score (democracy) 
4) Freedom index (freedom) 
5) Freedom of press (freepress) 
6) Geopolitical aspirations (geopol) 
7) Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) 
The model summary of the logistic regression (Table 11) shows how much of the variance 
of the dependent variable can be explained with the variance of the independent variables. 
Based on the Nagelkerke R square value of 0,379 it can be said that the selected variables 
63 
 
account for 38% variance in the outcome of Olympic bids. Next, individual effects of each 
independent variable were assessed. 
 
Table 11: Logistic regression model summary. 
Step -2 Log 
likelihood 
Cox & Snell R 
Square 
Nagelkerke R 
Square 
1 32,035
a
 ,217 ,379 
a. Estimation terminated at iteration number 7 because 
parameter estimates changed by less than ,001. 
 
Table 12: Logistic regression, variables in the equation. 
 
In Table 12, contributions of all the variables to the outcome of bids can be observed. The 
logistic regression equation for predicting the dependent variable (p being the probability of 
winning a bid) was constructed on the basis of the coefficients and is presented as follows: 
ln(p/1-p) = b0 + b1*x1 + b2*x2 + b3*x3 + b3*x3+b4*x4  
ln(p/1-p) = -9,059 + (-2,108)*market + 0,06*democracy + (-0,62)*freedom + 
0.098*freepress + 4,136*geopol + 0,307*CPI 
The overall effect of GDP is shown to be significant but because of high variance, a single 
digit change has no effect (B=0) and that is why GDP was excluded from the equation.  
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The 2-tailed p-values provide statistical significance of the variables. 0,05 was selected as α 
value. Only two variables – GDP and geopolitical aspirations – proved to be statistically 
significant which mean they contribute most to the probability of winning Olympic bids. 
According to the regression, most probable bid winning countries would therefore be 
geopolitically motivated wealthy states. This description suits perfectly with the profile of 
emerging countries. 
Exp(B) values in the table are odds ratios. Geopolitical aspirations, which was the 
statistically most significant variable (p=0.03), also has the biggest effect on the bid 
outcome. Based on the odds ratio, countries with existent geopolitical motives for hosting 
the Olympic Games have a 62,5 times higher probability of winning the bid.  
Table 13 shows the explanatory power of the composed regression. Overall, 90,6% of all 
cases were predicted correctly. The logistical model has very good sensitivity as it managed 
to predict losing bids at 100%. The specificity, however, is not so good as only 37,5% of 
positive outcomes were predicted correctly. High explanatory value for losing bids and low 
explanatory value for winning could come from the significant difference in sample sizes.   
 Table 13: Logistic regression, classification table. 
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3.4 Summary of empirical analysis results 
By comparing the central tendencies of bid losers and winners it was established that a high 
level of GDP, less democracy, more corruption and clear geopolitical motivations make up 
for a relatively more successful bid. Higher freedom levels tend be inhibitory for winning. 
The supposed new-market effect for winning bids was disproven.   
A binominal logistic regression was performed to estimate the effects of the independent 
variables on the likelihood that applicants win the rights to host the Olympic Games in the 
bidding process. The constructed model explained 38% (Nagelkerke R square) of the 
variance in winning the bid and correctly predicted 90,6% of all the cases. GDP and 
geopolitical aspirations were shown to be statistically most significant in determining the 
winner. The model was not very good though for predicting positive outcomes and the 
overall statistical significance of individual variables was weak. 
The drift of international sport towards emerging countries was best described by 
geopolitical aspirations, host country corruption and political regime arguments. Political 
and press freedoms showed very little effect. Economic and market mechanisms had a 
slightly negative effect on the drift towards emerging countries and rather increased the 
winning potential of developed countries.   
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CONCLUSION 
The first goal of this thesis was to determine why international sport is moving to emerging 
countries. Another goal was to prove the importance of political factors in the mega-event 
bid process. Four hypotheses to meet these goals were established, discussed in theory and 
empirically tested with data from eight Olympic Games to be held in the period between 
2008 and 2022. 
The first hypothesis proposed that the drift of international sport towards emerging 
countries is part of the IOCs expansion to new markets. Although theory and previous 
literature backed this theory, empirical evidence used in this research showed it not to be 
true. It was also assumed under this hypothesis that richer emerging countries had better 
chances of winning hosting rights. Although higher GDP was found to generally improve 
the winning probability, it did not specifically favor emerging countries. The hypothesis 
was therefore considered disproven altogether. 
The second hypothesis stated that it was easier to host mega-events in less free regions and 
that less democratic countries are more likely to win bids. Both theoretical and empirical 
evidence supported these assumptions although the effect was considered statistically not 
very significant. 
The third hypothesis said that geopolitical goals were pursued when bidding for hosting a 
sports mega-event. It was presumed that the bigger such aspirations are, the more eager the 
country is to host an event. The existence of geopolitical incentives was found to differ the 
most between the winners and losers of Olympic bids. It was therefore concluded that 
countries with clear geopolitical goals are more dedicated to the bidding process and more 
likely to win bids as a result. 
The fourth hypothesis claimed that it was easier to host mega-events in more corrupt 
systems. Corruption levels were indeed found to be higher amongst the winning countries 
of Olympic bids. There was not enough evidence to support the supposed corruption of 
sports organizations and bribes on the outcome of bids though. 
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Because all three hypothesis which considered socio-political factors were proven and only 
the first hypothesis which considered economic and market mechanisms was disproven the 
importance of politics in organizing sports mega-event was also proven. 
Further research could include other global sports mega-events like the FIFA football 
World Cup and some regional sports festivals like the European Games and 
Commonwealth Games. Possibly some other socio-political, economic and psychological 
variables could be included to further address the emergence of new players to the world 
stage.  
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APPENDIX 
Observed indicators of geopolitical aspirations and corruption 
Observed Geopolitical aspirations: 
0 – No significant geopolitical aspirations noted 
1 – Specific emphasize on regional and local importance of the Games 
2 – Seeking regional dominance and/or international status 
3 – Control over disputed areas 
4 – Geopolitical self-determination 
5 – Issues with forceful gentrification, land acquisition and/or the existence of special 
legislation to allow it 
Observed Corruption cases: 
0 – No evidence of corruptive methods used 
1 – Bribery and/or expensive gifts 
2 – Use of middlemen, special deals and the influence of third parties 
3 – Services to the IOC members and/or their families 
Winning bids are marked with * 
Applicant cities for Olympic 
Games 
Observed geopolitical 
aspirations 
Observed corruption cases 
Beijing 2008 (China)* 1; 2; 3; 4; 5 2 
Istanbul 2008 (Turkey) 1;2; 4; 5 0 
Osaka 2008 (Japan) 0 0 
Paris 2008 (France) 0 0 
Toronto 2008 (Canada) 5 2 
Bangkok 2008 (Thailand) 2 0 
Cairo 2008 (Egypt) 2 0 
Havana 2008 (Cuba) 2 0 
Kuala Lumpur 2008 (Malaysia) 2 0 
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Seville 2008 (Spain) 0 0 
Vancouver 2010 (Canada)* 1; 3 2 
Bern 2010 (Switzerland) 0 0 
Pyeongchang 2010 (South 
Korea) 
1; 2 1 
Salzburg 2010 (Austria) 0 0 
Andorra la Vella 2010 
(Andorra) 
0 0 
Harbin 2010 (China) 1; 2; 3, 4 0 
Jaca 2010 (Spain) 1 0 
Sarajevo 2010 (Bosnia and 
Herzegovina) 
2 0 
London 2012 (United 
Kingdom)* 
5 1 
Madrid 2012 (Spain) 0 0 
Moscow 2012 (Russia) 2; 4 2 
New York 2012 (United States) 0 0 
Paris 2012 (France) 0 0 
Havana 2012 (Cuba) 2 0 
Istanbul 2012 (Turkey) 1; 2; 4;  0 
Leipzig 2012 (Germany) 0 0 
Rio de Janeiro 2012 (Brazil) 1; 2; 4; 5 0 
Sochi 2014 (Russia)* 1; 2; 3; 4; 5 1 
Pyeongchang 2014 (South 
Korea) 
1; 2 0 
Salzburg 2014 (Austria) 0 0 
Almaty 2014 (Kazakhstan) 1; 2; 4 0 
Borjomi 2014 (Georgia) 1; 2; 3; 4 0 
Jaca 2014 (Spain) 1 0 
Sofia 2014 (Bulgaria) 2; 4 0 
Rio de Janeiro 2016 (Brazil)* 1; 2; 4; 5 0 
Chicago 2016 (United States) 0 0 
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Madrid 2016 (Spain) 0 0 
Tokyo 2016 (Japan) 0 0 
Baku 2016 (Azerbaijan) 1; 2; 4 0 
Doha 2016 (Qatar) 1; 2; 4 0 
Prague 2016 (Czech Republic) 0 0 
Pyeongchang 2018 (South 
Korea)* 
1; 2 3 
Annecy 2018 (France) 0 0 
Munich 2018 (Germany) 0 0 
Tokyo 2020 (Japan)* 0 0 
Istanbul 2020 (Turkey) 1; 2; 4; 5 0 
Madrid 2020 (Spain) 0 0 
Rome 2020 (Italy) 0 0 
Baku 2020 (Azerbaijan) 1; 2; 4 0 
Doha 2020 (Qatar) 1; 2; 4 0 
Almaty 2022 (Kazakhstan) 1; 2; 4 0 
Beijing 2022 (China)* 1; 2; 3; 4 0 
Kraków 2022 (Poland) 1; 2; 4 0 
Lviv 2022 (Ukraine) 2; 4 0 
Oslo 2022 (Norway) 0 0 
Stockholm 2022 (Sweden) 0 0 
Used sources: reports of the IOC Evaluation Commission for the Games 2008 – 2022, reports by the IOC 
Candidature Acceptance Working Group for the Games of 2010, 2012, 2014. 
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KOKKUVÕTE 
 
Spordi suurürituste geopoliitika: miks on rahvusvaheline sport liikumas 
arenguriikidesse? 
 
Viimastel aastatel on paljude globaalse ulatusega spordi suurürituste korraldamine antud 
tõusvate arenguriikide kätesse. Paljudes arenenud riikides on selline trend põhjustanud 
vastakaid arvamusi kuna ühest küljest peljatakse peamiselt majanduslikel kaalutlustel 
suurüritusi ise korraldada ja samaaegselt ollakse jällegi häiritud vähemdemokraatlike 
arenguriikide tõlgendustest läänelikke väärtusi kandvate suurürituste korraldamisel. Kui 
varasemalt on korraldusõiguste omistamist mõjutavate faktorite uurimisel peamist 
tähelepanu pööratud tehnilistele ja majanduslikele näitajatele, siis käesolev magistritöö 
keskendus rohkem poliitilis-sotsiaalsetele muutujatele ja ajenditele. Uurimustöö käigus 
leiti, et geopoliitiliste kaalutluste olemasolu soodustab enim rahvusvahelise spordi liikumist 
tõusvate arenguriikide suunas. 
Töö teoreetiline osa uuris spordi suurürituste ja globaliseerumise omavahelisi mõjusid. 
Leiti, et globaliseerumise ja rahvusvahelise spordi tavapärane käsitlemine ülemaailmse 
kultuurilise ühtlustumise kiirendajana ei vasta täielikult tõele. Oluliseks peeti spordi 
võistluslikust olemusest tingitud võimekust tugevdada rahvuslike emotsioonide 
esilekerkimist. Globaliseerumist vaadeldi spordi suurürituste kontekstis seega pigem 
keeruka nähtusena, milles segunevad globaalsed ja lokaalsed, rahvuslikud ja 
rahvusvahelised ning läänelikud ja mitte-läänelikud motiivid. Ühtlasi vaadeldi spordi 
suurüritusi asetatuna tsivilisatsioonide ja emotsioonide kokkupõrke keskpunkti. 
Olemasolevale kirjandusele tuginedes püstitati neli hüpoteesi, mis võiksid põhjendada 
arenguriikide edukust suurürituste korraldusõigustele kandideerimisel. 
Magistritöö empiiriline osa võrdles 2008. – 2022. aasta Olümpiamängude 
korraldamisõiguse nimel võistlevaid kandidaatriike. Kokku uuriti iga 56 juhtumi juures 
kaheksat sõltumatut muutujat. Muutujate mõju ja statistilise olulisuse hindamiseks viidi läbi 
logistiline regressioonanalüüs. 
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Magistritöö esimene hüpotees väitis, et rahvusvahelise spordi liikumine tõusvatesse 
arenguriikidesse on põhjustatud Rahvusvahelise Olümpiakommitee soovist laieneda uutele 
turgudele. Magistritöös kasutatud andmete põhjal ei leidnud see väide aga kinnitust. Ühtlasi 
eeldati, et rikkamad arenguriigid omavad eelist korraldusõiguste võitmisel. Kuigi riigi 
kõrgem sisemajanduse koguprodukt omas üldiselt positiivset mõju, ei soosinud see eraldi 
arenguriike. Esimene hüpotees lükati uurimuse käigus seega ümber. 
Teine hüpotees ütles, et spordi suurürituste korraldamine on lihtsam vähemdemokraatlikes 
ja vähemate vabadustega riikides. Väide leidis kinnitust nii teoreetiliselt kui empiiriliselt 
ehkki vastavate muutujate mõju polnud statistiliselt väga oluline. 
Kolmas hüpotees väitis, et tõusvad arenguriigid on kõrgemalt motiveeritud spordi 
suurürituste korraldusõiguste võitmiseks geopoliitiliste püüdluste olemasolu tõttu. Vastav 
väide osutus empiirilise uurimuse käigus ka enim mõju avaldanud näitjaks. 
Neljas hüpotees ütles, et spordi suurürituste korraldamine on lihtsam enamkorrumpeerunud 
riikides. Korruptsiooni tase oli Olümpiamängude korraldusõiguse võitnud riikide hulgas ka 
keskmiselt kõrgem kui kaotajatel.  
Kõik kolm poliitilis-sotsiaalset hüpoteesi leidsid kinnitust ja ainult esimene majanduslikke 
ja turumehhanisme käsitlev hüpotees lükati ümber. Seega kinnitati magistritööga ka 
poliitiliste näitajate olulisust spordi suurürituste korraldusõiguste omistamisel ja spordi 
liikumises tõusvate arenguriikide suunas. 
 
